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Abstract
I examine whether a benevolent government can improve on the free market allocation
by setting capital requirements for private borrowers in a stochastic model with collateral
constraints. Previous theoretical studies have found that when asset prices enter into bor-
rowing constraints, pecuniary externalities between atomistic agents can make the laissez
faire equilibrium constrained ine¢ cient. For reasonable parameter values, I nd that, quan-
titatively, the answer is noprivate and government leverage choices coincide. Limiting
private leverage by imposing capital requirements has the benecial e¤ect of dampening the
e¤ects of the collateral amplication mechanism. This reduces re salesin recessions and
limits the negative externality that individual asset sales have on other credit constrained
borrowers.
However, we nd that capital requirements are a blunt tool. They tax the activities of
highly productive entrepreneurs and reduce the amount they produce in equilibrium. This
reduces total factor productivity and steady state consumption. In the end, society faces
a choice between high but unstable consumption in the free borrowing world and low but
stable consumption in the regulated world. The government chooses the former.
JEL Classication: E21.
Key Words: Collateral constraints, Capital Requirements.
1 Introduction
The 2007-09 nancial crisis brought the world nancial system to the brink of collapse,
leading to calls for tighter regulation in order to prevent a repeat of the crisis. Excessive
leverageis thought to be one of the main culprits for the fragility of the economy in the
face of shocks. This has re-opened the debate of whether private banks, corporates and
households tend to take socially optimal borrowing decisions. In this paper we examine the
optimality of rmsleverage decisions using a standard macroeconomic model with credit
frictions. We examine whether a benevolent government can improve ex ante welfare by
imposing capital requirements which are di¤erent from those chosen by the market.
A growing academic literature has shown that the prevalence of uncontingent debt has
the potential of interacting with binding collateral constraints in order to magnify the e¤ects
of shocks to the economy. The mechanism is based on di¤erent versions of the the collateral
amplication argument popularised by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). More recently, Lorenzoni (2008), Gromb
and Vayanos (2002) and Korinek (2009) have shown that, in an environment of binding credit
constraints, private leverage tends to be excessive from a social point of view due to the
presence of a market price externality. This externality arises because private borrowers do
not internalise the e¤ects of their own nancial distress on other borrowers. When collateral
constraints tighten due to an adverse aggregate shock, leveraged debtorsnet worth declines
and they need to sell assets in order to satisfy the collateral constraint. This nancial
distressscenario leads to private losses which are fully taken into account by rms when
they decide ex ante how much debt to take on.
What private borrowers ignore, however, is the market price externality of nancial dis-
tress. The larger the volume of asset sales following an adverse shock to collateral values, the
bigger the eventual decline in capital prices and the wider the spectre of nancial distress.
Individual borrowers, however, do not take such general equilibriume¤ects into account.
They take the state contingent evolution of market prices as exogenous, treating their own
leverage decisions as irrelevant for aggregate outcomes. In contrast, the government takes
the market price externalities in question into account when designing the optimal state
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contingent capital adequacy rules.
This paper focuses on the quantitative question of whether taking the market price exter-
nality into account leads the government to choose very di¤erent capital requirements from
those already required by the market. We use a business cycle model with credit constraints,
which is similar to Kiyotaki (1998). In our environment borrowing and lending is motivated
by a heterogeneity in the productivity of di¤erent rms. But because debt is assumed to
be uncontingent and secured against collateral, aggregate shocks can damage the net worth
of borrowers and reduce their access to nance. I assume that borrowing entrepreneurs in
the model know that aggregate productivity shocks may hit and this gives them an incen-
tive to hedge their net worth by borrowing less than the market determined debt limit.
We nevertheless nd that high productivity rms choose to take the maximum permitted
leverage despite the risks to net worth this involves. The intuition for this is simple. High
productivity entrepreneurs earn such a good return on their productive assets that insuring
their net worth by leaving themselves with spare debt capacity is too costly. Because the
owners of these fast growing rms have very good future consumption opportunities, saving
at prevailing market prices is a very bad proposition for them. So they rationally choose to
leverage up to the debt limit, accepting the ex post volatility in the rate of return on their
portfolios.
The main result of the paper is the following. When we allow a benevolent government to
choose state contingent capital requirements to maximise ex ante social welfare, we nd that
the government makes identical choices to the market for reasonable parameter values. In
other words, the government chooses capital requirements which are equal to the incentive
compatible debt limits. We nd that this surprising result arises from the balance of the
costs and benets of regulation around the private optimum. Tightening capital requirements
relative to the market-imposed borrowing limits has the benet of dampening the collateral
amplication mechanism and reducing the volatility of asset prices and consumption over
the economic cycle. This cyclical volatility is excessivefrom a social point of view because
leveraged borrowers do not take into account the e¤ect of their own forced asset sales on other
leveraged borrowers. But the government considers the costs of regulation too. In our model,
the ow of nance from low to high productivity entrepreneurs increases the economys TFP
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by putting more of the economys productive resources into the hands of those best able
to make use of them. When the government regulates leverage, more production has to be
undertaken by ine¢ cient rms and this depresses average TFP and consumption over time.
How the government locates itself on this trade o¤ between increasing the economys
average productivity and consumption and increasing its consumption volatility is a function
of the costs of business cycles in the model. We nd that, quantitatively, these costs are
small. Because the government acts in the social interest, it allows private agents to borrow
as much as can be credibly repaid without imposing tighter capital requirements than the
market.
Interestingly, we nd that the no overborrowingresult does not arise because amplica-
tion in the model is small. Contrary to the results of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) we nd that
it is large, increasing the standard deviation of output by 40% higher than the rst best with-
out making any non-standard assumptions about preferences or the productive technology.
The di¤erence between our results and those of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) arise out of our
assumption of constant returns to scale to all factors, which helps to maintain productivity
di¤erences between rms even in the face of large shocks to their relative outputs. This
result shows that the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) framework is capable of generating quan-
titatively large amplication for reasonable calibrations. Nevertheless, despite generating a
lot of amplication, the framework does not generate strong incentives to regulate nancial
transactions. This is because consumers care more about having a high rate of return on
wealth and this dominates the welfare costs due to business cycle uctuations.
Finally, we need to stress that the pecuniary externality our paper discusses is only one of
the many reasons for capital regulation. Our framework misses out one very important reason
for capital regulation - the risk shifting behaviour caused by the possibility of bankruptcy
or a government bail-out. There is a large literature which has studied the incentives for
banks and other private borrowers to take excessive risks when they know that losses in the
worst case scenarios will be borne by lenders or the government. While such factors are
undoubtedly an important cause of nancial crises, we abstract from them in this paper in
order to keep our framework tractable1.
1We study borrowing contracts which feature no bankruptcy in equilibrium. Also we assume that the
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature in
a little more detail. Section 3 outlines the model environment. Section 4 outlines the com-
petitive equilibrium for our model economy. Section 6 outlines the governments objective
function and policy instrument. Section 5 compares private and government leverage choices
and uses numerical simulation of the economy to illustrate the costs and benets of tighter
collateral requirements. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 The collateral amplication mechanism
This model is related to a large and rapidly growing literature on the credit amplication
mechanism and on the pecuniary externalities this generates. The collateral amplication
transmission channel was rst popularised by the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki (1998) Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). All these models examine the e¤ect of nancing frictions on
aggregate allocations. In them, the net worth of agents who have productive opportunities is
key in determining the cost and availability of external nance. Adrian and Shin (2009) have
explored this mechanism in the context of multiple leveraged traders in nancial markets.
2.2 Pecuniary externalities and the e¢ ciency of private leverage
The central question of this paper is related to an older literature which has examined
the constrained e¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium in an economy with moral hazard
and adverse selection. Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) showed using a simple insurance moral
hazard example that the competitive equilibrium is constrained ine¢ cient when prices a¤ect
insureesincentives to take care. Kehoe and Levine (1993) show that the competitive equilib-
rium in their debt constrainedeconomy is only e¢ cient in a single good world. Multi-good
economies are not necessarily constrained e¢ cient because relative prices a¤ect the value of
government cannot make transfers. This rules out two of the most widely studied mechanism which generate
overborrowing by private agents.
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default and this introduces a market price externality which is not taken into account by
atomistic private agents. What these papers show is that when relative prices determine the
tightness of incentive compatibility constraints, this drives a wedge between the decisions
of private agents and the decisions of the social planner. Private individuals take prices
as given while the social planner recognises that manipulating prices can relax some of the
constraints it is facing.2
Even more closely related to the topic of this paper, work by Lorenzoni (2008), Korinek
(2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) have shown rigorously that the presence of asset
prices in the collateral constraint can generate a pecuniary asset price externality between
leveraged borrowers. Distressed sales by one set of borrowers can push down asset prices,
damaging the net worth and credit access of other borrowers. Private agents ignore this
externality, generating incentives for government intervention in order to bring the social
costs and benets of leverage into line with one another. These papers provide the theoretical
motivation in a simple three period framework for the quantitative investigation we undertake
here in an innite horizon macro model.
Korinek (2008) and Bianchi (2009) have also examined the possibility of excessive ex-
ternal debt in the an emerging market context. In Korinek (2008), borrowing in foreign
currency is cheaper for individual rms because of the risk premium on domestic currency
debt. However, foreign currency debt leaves domestic entrepreneurs vulnerable to a sharp
appreciation of the domestic real exchange rate. In Bianchi (2009), uctuations in the price
of non-traded goods work in the same way to introduce sudden sharp changes in real debt
values. In both of these models, just like in the model of this paper, the externality works
through pecuniary externalities that a¤ect the tightness of borrowing constraints.
2.3 The welfare costs of business cycles
How the government trades o¤ average consumption against the volatility of consumption is
an important reason behind the results of this paper. This issue connects with the literature
2Prescott and Townsend (1984) showed that introducing man-made lotteries into the economy can remove
the externality in question and restore the constrained e¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium.
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on the welfare costs of business cycles, which was started by Lucas (1987)s seminal contribu-
tion. Lucas (1987) found that the cost of aggregate consumption volatility was of the order
of 0.08% of annual consumption, implying that business cycle volatility is not an important
determinant of social welfare. Lucas (1987), of course, recognised that imperfections in risk
sharing had the potential of increasing the cost of business cycles at least for some groups
in society.
This nding spurred a lot of research on the e¤ect of risk sharing and consumer  het-
erogeneity on the welfare costs of business cycles. Krussell and Smith (1998) examine this
question in an innitely lived economy with aggregate uncertainty in which individuals are
subject to unsinsurable idiosyncratic shocks. Storsletten et al. (2001) extended Krussell and
Smiths analysis to an economy with nitely lived overlapping generations. They found that
the welfare costs of the business cycle vary substantially across di¤erent groups in society
and are larger than Lucasorginal numbers but still far from enormous. We nd that the
small costs of business cycles play a substantial role in determining the costs and benets of
regulation in our framework too.
3 The Model
3.1 The Economic Environment
3.1.1 Population and Production Technology
The economy is populated with a continuum of innitely lived entrepreneurs and a continuum
of innitely lived workers - both of measure 1. Each entrepreneur is endowed with a constant
returns to scale production function which uses capital k, labour h and intermediate inputs
x to produce gross output y.
yt = atAt

kt 1


xt 1

 
ht 1
1    
1  
where a is the idiyosyncratic component of productivity which is revealed to the entrepre-
neur one period in advance and can be high aH or low aL. The idiosyncratic state evolves
according to a Markov process. Following Kiyotaki (1998) let n be the probability that a
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currently unproductive rm becomes productive and let be the probability that a currently
productive rm becomes unproductive. This implies that the steady state ratio of produc-
tive to unproductive rms is n. The aggregate state also evolves according to a persistent
Markov process.
At is the aggregate component of productivity which also evolves according to a Markov
process and alternates between high and low values. The realisaton of the aggregate state
At occurs at the beginning of time t.
Intermediate inputs x are produced one for one from consumption goods and fully de-
preciate between periods. Capital is in xed aggregate supply and does not depreciate. The
only nancial asset is simple debt.
3.1.2 Commitment technology and private information
Agents su¤er from limited commitment. They cannot make binding promises unless it is in
their interests to do so. In addition, idiosyncratic productivity realisations and individual
asset holdings are private information.
3.2 Entrepreneurs
3.2.1 Preferences
Entrepreneurs are ex-ante identical and have logarithmic utility over consumption streams
UE = E0
1X
t=0
t ln ct
3.2.2 Flow of Funds
Entrepreneurs purchase consumption (c), working intermediate inputs (x), capital (k) at
price q and labour (h) at wage w. All inputs are chosen a period in advance. Entrepreneurs
borrow using debt securities bt at price 1=Rt.
ct + wtht + xt + qtkt   bt
Rt
= yt + qtkt 1   bt 1
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Because we assume that idiosyncratic shocks and individual asset holdings are private infor-
mation, securities contingent on the realisation of the idiosyncratic state will not trade in
equilibrium.
3.2.3 Collateral constraints
Due to moral hazard in the credit market, agents will only honour their promises if it is in
their interests to do so. We assume that only a fraction  of capital holdings can be seized by
creditors. We also assume that entrepreneurs only have the opportunity to default before the
aggregate shock has been realised. Hence the collateral constraint limits the entrepreneurs
debt to the expected value of collateralisable capital3:
bt 6 Etqt+1kt (1)
Note that  here is assumed to be exogenously given by the underlying limited commitment
problem in this economy. It therefore cannot be a¤ected by the government. When we come
to analyse the governments choice of capital requirements, we will allow it to choose the
capital requirement et 6 . This will then place a limit on private leverage over and above
the limit imposed by the incentive compatibility constraint (1).
3We also consider an alternative collateral constraint which limits borrowing by the realisation of the
land price in the worst case scenario. In our case there are only two aggregate productivity states so lenders
look at the value of collateral in the low aggregate state.
bt+1 6 qLt+1kt+1
Such a collateral constraint would obtain if borrowers were allowed to default after the realisation of the
aggregate productivity shock. Lenders would then want to insure themselves against losses by only lending
up to the value at which entrepreneurs would never default.
We found that using such a form of the collateral constraint did not signicantly a¤ect the results we get.
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3.3 Workers
3.3.1 Preferences
Workers have the following preferences:
UW = E0
1X
t=0
t ln

ct   { h
1+!
t
1 + !

3.3.2 Flow of Funds
Workers do not have the opportunity to produce. They purchase consumption (c) and save
using debt securities bt at price 1=Rt. Their net worth consists of labour income (wtht) and
bonds bt 1.
ct +
bt
Rt
= wtht + bt 1
3.3.3 Collateral constraints
Due to moral hazard in the credit market, workers cannot borrow:
bt > 0 (2)
4 Competitive Equilibrium
4.1 Entrepreneurial behaviour
Entrepreneurs make decisions based on three key margins. First of all they decide how much
to consume today and how much to save for future consumption. Secondly, they need to
decide how to divide their savings between safe bonds and risky production - the portfolio
problem. Thirdly, within the amount they invest in production, they need to decide on the
input mix between capital, intermediate inputs and labour - the production problem.
Let V (zt; at; Xt) denote the value of an entrepreneur with wealth zt, idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity level at (determined and revealed to the entrepreneur at time t   1) when the
aggregate state is Xt  [At; Zt; dt]. For now we simply assume that the aggregate state
consists of the aggregate technology realisation At, total wealth in the economy Zt as well as
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the share of wealth held by high productivity entrepreneurs dt. We will prove subsequently
that this is the case.
The value function is dened recursively as follows:
V (zt; at; Xt) = max
xt;kt;bt;ht;ct
fln ct + EtV (zt+1; at+1; Xt+1)g (3)
where the maximisation is performed subject to the current resource constraint,
ct + wtht + xt + qtkt   bt
Rt
6 zt
the transition law for individual wealth,
zt+1 = at+1At+1

kt


xt

 
ht
1    
1  
+ qt+1kt   bt
the collateral constraint
bt 6 Etqt+1kt
the Markov process for the idiosyncratic productivity shock and the transition law for the
aggregate state. The aggregate technology shock evolves according to a Markov process.
The share of wealth held by high productivity entrepreneurs is an endogenous variable and
we will describe its evolution as part of our characterisation of the competitive equilibrium
of our model economy.
4.1.1 Optimal consumption
In Appendix A we prove that the log utility assumption ensures that consumption is always
a xed fraction of wealth that depends upon the discount factor.
ct = (1  ) zt
4.1.2 Optimal production
When borrowing constraints bind, high and low productivity entrepreneurs will make dif-
ferent production decisions. This is why we examine the optimal production deisions of the
two groups separately.
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High productivity entrepreneurs In equilibrium, the high productivity entrepre-
neurs will turn out to be the borrowers in this economy. Optimal production implies that
the input mix between capital, labour and intermediate inputs is given by the following
expressions:
xt = u
H
t kt= (4)
and
ht =
1    

uHt
wt
kt (5)
where uHt is the user cost of capital faced by high productivity entrepreneurs.
When the borrowing constraint is binding, this means that the entrepreneur derives
additional value from purchasing capital because this relaxes the collateral constraint. This
value (in terms of goods) can be easily derived from the rst order condition with respect to
borrowing:
t
t
=
1
Rt
  Et

ct
ct+1

=
1
Rt
  Et

1
RHt+1

where RHt+1 is the rate of return on wealth for high productivity entrepreneurs (to be pinned
down later in the paper) and t and t are the Lagrange multipliers on the borrowing and
resource constraints. The value of relaxing the borrowing constraint by a unit is equal to the
di¤erence between the market price of future consumption (the price of debt) and the private
valuation of future consumption. Credit constrained borrowers are those who value future
consumption less than the market because their wealth and consumption are growing fast.
They would like to borrow unlimited amounts at prevailing market prices but are prevented
from doing so by binding collateral constraints.
In general the user cost expression is given by:
uHt = qt   Et

qt+1
RHt+1

  Etqt+1t
t
When credit constraints bind, the user cost expression is give by:
uHt = qt   Et

qt+1
RHt+1

  Etqt+1

1
Rt
  Et

1
RHt+1

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while when they do not bind, the shadow price on the borrowing constraint t = 0 and the
user cost is given by:
uHt = qt   Et

qt+1
RHt+1

Low productivity entrepreneurs In equilibrium, low productivity entrepreneurs are
always unconstrained savers. When borrowing constraints bind su¢ ciently tightly, they
also end up producing using their ine¢ cient technology. Suppose that we are in such an
environment where e¢ cient and ine¢ cient technologies are both used due to the borrowing
constraint. Then the rst order condition for optimal capital input by the low productivity
producers is as follows:
uLt = qt   Et

qt+1
RLt+1

where RLt+1  zt+1zt is the rate of return on wealth for a low productivity entrepreneur (to
be specied later on in the paper). This is a standard user cost expression. Because our
economy has two aggregate states and two assets (debt and productive projects), markets
for aggregate risk are complete and  (s) =RLt+1 (s) is the price of an Arrow security that pays
a unit of consumption if state s is realised in the next period. The Et

qt+1
RLt+1

term is the
present value of the capital unit tomorrow evaluated at Arrow security prices.
Conditional upon the user cost of capital, low productivity entrepreneurs have the same
input mix as high productivity types. However, high productivity entrepreneurs will use less
capital intensive production strategies because they face a higher cost of capital compared
to low productivity ones. We will return to the link between downpayment requirements
and the user cost of capital later because it is key to the policy conclusions of the paper.
4.1.3 The portfolio problem
In the previous two subsections we characterised the solution of two of the consumers three
decision margins: the consumption function and the optimal input mix into production.
Now what remains is to solve for the optimal mix between productive projects and loans to
other entrepreneurs. For the high productivity entrepreneurs who are the borrowers in our
economy this problem boils down to choosing optimal leverage. For the low productivity
savers, it will be a choice of whether to produce or lend at the margin.
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High productivity entrepreneurs In equilibrium, high productivity entrepreneurs have
investment opportunities in excess of the rates of return available on market securities (in this
model, simple debt). Consequently they will want to leverage up in order to take advantage
of this (temporary) investment opportunity. Let lt  bt=Etqt+1kt denote the fraction of the
entrepreneurs capital purchase which is nanced by debt. This fraction is bounded from
above by the collateral constraint, which states that, in the laissez faire economy, at most
 fraction can be borrowed. In the regulated economy lt will be bounded by the capital
requirement chosen by the government, et.
In Appendix B we show that a high productivity entrepreneur who borrows a fraction
lt 6  to fund his capital purchases will earn the following rate of return:
RHt+1 =
 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1   ltEtqt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =  (lt=Rt)Etqt+1
(6)
The numerator of the above expression denotes project revenues consisting of output per
unit of capital (
 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
) and the value of capital (qt+1) net of debt
repayments ltEtqt+1. The denominator denotes the total cost of undertaking the project. It
consists of the total cost of capital (qt) and other inputs ((1  )uHt =) minus the amount
of nancing the entrepreneur chose to undertake via debt markets (lt=Rt)Etqt+1. So in other
words, RHt+1 is the leveraged rate of return on production.
In Appendix C we show that the entrepreneurs value function depends on the net presenst
value of future expected rates of return on wealth. The entrepreneur, therefore, chooses lt
in order to maximise the expected log rate of return on wealth.
lnRH = max
lt
Et ln
" 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1   ltEtqt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =  (lt=Rt)Etqt+1
#
(7)
subject to the constraint:
lt 6 et (8)
To get a more intuitive understanding of the leverage decision, we can think of the
entrepeneurs leverage decision as a standard portfolio problem in which the entrepreneur
chooses how much of his savings to put into a risky and a safe asset. We dene the return
on the risky asset as the return on a productive project together with the returns from the
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capital holding that goes with it:
Rkt+1 =
 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =
Then we can write the rate of return on the entrepreneurs total portfolio as the weighted
average between the risky and the safe rate of return:
RHt+1 = $
H
t R
k
t+1 +
 
1 $Ht

Rt
where
$Ht 
qt + (1  )uHt =
qt + (1  )uHt =  (lt=Rt)Etqt+1
> 1 (9)
is the share of the risky asset in the high productivity entrepreneurs portfolio. Entrepreneurs
are free to choose a value of lt below  if they are unconstrained. However, the maximum
share of the risky asset is determined by the borrowing constraint and is given by:4
$Hmax 
qt + (1  )uHt =
qt + (1  )uHt =  (=Rt)Etqt+1
> 1 (10)
In Appendix E we show that we can take a second order approximation to the portfolio
problem as follows:
lnRH  max
$Ht
"
lnRt +$
H
t
 
Et
H
t+1   1
   $Ht 2
2
2Rt+1
#
where the expected excess return on production for high productivity agents is dened as
follows:
Et
H
t+1 =
EtR
k
t+1
Rt
= Et
  
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =
!
=Rt (11)
4The larger lt the higher the share of risky assets in the entrepreneurs portfolio. As (9) shows, when
lt > 0, the share of the risky asset $Ht is greater than unity. But even when the entrepreneur borrows the
full value of her capital purchases, this does not mean that she is unconstrained in her borrowing. As long
as the expected return on the risky asset Rkt+1 is su¢ ciently greater than the interest rate on safe debt Rt
to compensate for risk, the entrepreneur will remain credit constrained and would like to borrow against the
value of her future output as well.
Reducing the value of lt below the market determined  is tantamount to the entrepreneur choosing to
reduce his holdings of the risky asset. As the entrepreneur borrows less and less, lt falls and with it $Ht falls
too. If the entrepreneur decides to become a net saver, lt falls below zero. In the limit, as lt becomes large
and negative, $Ht tends to zero and the portfolio of the entrepreneur consists of only the safe asset.
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The conditional variance of the log rate of return of the risky asset 2Rt+1 is dominated
by the variance of the capital price as well as the covariance of the capital price with the
technology shock (for more details see Appendix E). Both of these terms increase strongly
as the collateral amplication mechanism becomes stronger. The rst order condition is:
@ lnRH
@$Ht
 EtHt+1   1 $Ht 2Rt+1 > 0 (12)
It holds with equality if the collateral constraint does not bind. Re-arranging we get:
$Ht 
SHt+1
Rt+1
where SHt+1  Et
H
t+1 1
Rt+1
is the conditional Sharpe ratio on the risky asset for the high pro-
ductivity entrepreneur. Rt+1 is determined by the volatility of the technology shock 2A as
well as the volatility of the capital price 2qt+1. The higher these are, the smaller the share
of the risky asset chosen by the entrepreneur. Equally a higher premium EtHt+1  1 leads to
a larger share invested in the risky asset.
This means that, in general, the share of the risky asset in the high productivity entre-
preneurs portfolio is given by:
$Ht = min

Et
H
t+1   1
2Rt+1
;
qt + (1  )uHt =
qt + (1  )uHt =  (=Rt)Etqt+1

where qt+(1 )u
H
t =
qt+(1 )uHt = (=Rt)Etqt+1
is the share of the risky asset when the constraint is binding.
Low productivity entrepreneurs Low productivity entrepreneurs may or may not pro-
duce in equilibrium, depending on the tightness of the collateral constraint. When the
constraint binds very tightly, high productivity rms will be constrained in their ability to
purchase the productive assets in the economy and some of them will have to be bought by
low productivity rms. Consistent with the large variance of plant level productivity, we
focus on a level of  such that low productivity rms do end up producing in equilibrium,
nancing themselves using their own net worth. In Appendix D we show that the rate of
return on their net worth is given by:
RLt+1 =
h
(At+1=)w
+ 1
t
 
uLt
1 
+ qt+1
i
kt + bt
[qt + (1  )uLt =] kt + bt=Rt
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where the numerator consists of the revenues from production as well as debt repayments
received from other entprepreneurs, while the denominator is the cost of purchasing the
portfolio. Unlike, high productivity entrepreneurs who leverage up in order to invest in
production, low productivity entrepreneurs have more balanced portfolios, consisting of loans
to other entrepeneurs as well as own productive projects.
The portfolios of high and low productivity entrepreneurs are linked by the market clear-
ing conditions in the capital and debt markets. This means that once we have solved for the
optimal portfolio of the high productivity entrepreneurs, this also gives us the investment
choices of low productivity ones. In Appendix D we show that the equilibrium rate of return
on wealth for the low types is given below:
RLt+1 = $
L
t
"
(At+1=)w
+ 1
t
 
uLt
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uLt =
#
+
 
1 $Lt

Rt
where
$Lt 

qt + (1  )uLt =

(1 Kt)
[qt + (1  )uLt =] (1 Kt) + ltEtqt+1=Rt
< 1
is the share of the risky asset in the low productivity entrepreneurs portfolio. Note that this
is always less than one because this entrepreneur invests part of his savings into risk free
loans to other entrepreneurs. The risky asset available to the low productivity entrepreneur
earns a lower rate of return compared to the one held by high productivity ones. The excess
return for the lowtype is given by:
Et
L
t+1 = Et
 
(At+1=)w
+ 1
t
 
uLt
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uLt =
!
=Rt (13)
The conditions for the optimal portfolio composition of the low productivity type are
similar to those in the previous subsection:
$Lt 
SLt+1
rt+1
where SLt+1  Et
L
t+1 1
rt+1
is the conditional Sharpe ratio on the risky asset for the low produc-
tivity entrepreneur and rt+1 is the standard deviation of the log return on the risky asset.
Analogously with Rt+1, rt+1 is determined by the volatility of the technology shock 2A as
well as the volatility of the capital price 2qt+1.
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4.2 Behaviour of Workers
Let V W (bt 1; Xt) denote the value function of a worker with individual nancial wealth bt
when the aggregate state is Xt. The value function is given by:
V W (bt 1; Xt) = max
ct;ht;bt+1

ln

ct   { h
1+!
t
1 + !

+ EtV
W (bt; Xt+1)

subject to the ow of funds constraint and the borrowing constraint. The rst order condi-
tions are given by:
wt = {h!t (14)
1
ct   { h
1+!
t
1+!
= RtEt
0@ 1
ct+1   { h
1+!
t+1
1+!
1A
In equilibrium, workers will not save as long as the volatility of the aggregate wage is not too
great. This is because the risk free interest rate is below the workersrate of time preference.
This means that workers will consume their entire wage income in equilibrium and their
welfare will be dominated by the stochastic process for the aggregate wage rate5.
The result that workers consume their entire labour income allows us to drop the nancial
wealth state variable and simplify their value function considerably. Using the optimal labour
supply condition (14) we get to the following simple expression:
V W (Xt) =  +
!
1 + !
lnwt + EtV
W (Xt+1)
where  is a constant that depends on parameter values.
4.3 Aggregation and Market Clearing
We complete the characterisation of the competitive equilibrium of our model economy by
specifying the evolution equations for the endogenous state variables well as the market
clearing conditions.
5In solving the model we verify at each point in time that the condition for no saving holds
1
ct   { h
1+!
t
1+!
> RtEt
0@ 1
ct+1   { h
1+!
t+1
1+!
1A
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There are three market clearing conditions. The bond,Z
bt+1 (i) di = 0 (15)
capital Z
kt+1 (i) di = 1 (16)
and goods markets
CHt + C
L
t + C
W
t +X
H
t+1 +X
L
t+1 = Y
H
t + Y
L
t (17)
all clear.
Finally the economys endogenous state variables evolve according to the following tran-
sition law.
Zt+1 = R
H
t+1Z
H
t +R
L
t+1Z
L
t (18)
=

dtR
H
t+1 + (1  dt)RLt+1

Zt
dt+1 =
ZHt+1
Zt+1
(19)
=
(1  ) dtRHt+1 + n (1  dt)RLt+1
dtRHt+1 + (1  dt)RLt+1
4.4 Equilibrium Denition
Recursive competitive equilibrium of our model economy is a price system wt, uHt , u
L
t , qt, Rt,
value functions V Et and V
W
t , entrepreneur decision rules kt, xt, b
e
t , h
e
t and c
e
t , worker decision
rules bwt+1, h
w
t+1 and c
w
t , and equilibrium laws of motion for the endogenous state variables
(18) and (19) such that
(i) The value function V Et and the decision rules kt, xt, h
e
t , b
e
t and c
e
t solve the entre-
preneurs decision problem conditional upon the price system wt, uHt , u
L
t , qt, Rt, the value
function V Wt and the decision rules b
w
t , h
w
t and c
w
t solve the workers decision problem con-
ditional upon the price system wt, uHt , u
L
t , qt, Rt.
(ii) The process governing the transition of the aggregate productivity and the household
decision rules kt, xt, bet , h
e
t , c
e
t , b
w
t , h
w
t and c
w
t induce a transition process for the aggregate
state given by (18) and (19).
(iii) All markets clear
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5 The Economic Impact of Capital Requirements
Capital requirements are the main policy instrument for the government in our framework.
In this section we examine using numerical solutions of our model economy what their e¤ect
is on economic outcomes. We focus on the ways in which tighter borrowing limits a¤ects the
di¤erent distortions in the credit constrained economy in order to see how the government
trades them o¤ against one another. Section 6 will derive the optimal capital requirement.
5.1 Baseline Calibration
In this section we outline the basic features of the baseline calibration. More details can be
found in Appendix G.
We calibrate , the share of intermediate inputs in gross output to 0:45 using data from
the 2007 BEA Industrial Accounts. Using the Cooley and Prescott (1995) methodology we
calibrate  (the share of capital in gross output) to 0:2 which gives a share of 0:36 in value
added. We set  (the share of capital which can be collateralised for loans) to 1:0 in line
with the value used in Kiyotaki (1998) and Aoki et al (2009). However, since there is very
little information on the collateralisability of capital goods we conduct extensive sensitivity
analysis due to the highly uncertain value of this parameter.
The technology process at the rm level consists of an aggregate and an idiosyncratic
component. Because TFP is endogenous in the Kiyotaki-Moore framework we pick the
process for the aggregate exogenous technology shock to match the standard deviation of
HP-ltered real GDP. The high (low) realisations of the aggregate TFP shock are 0:6% above
(below) the steady state TFP level. The probability that the economy remains in the same
aggregate state it is today is equal to 0:8.
Calibrating the cross-sectional dispersion of TFP is important because the quantitative
importance of the pecuniary externality studied in our paper is related to the productivity
gap between high and low productivity rms. Bernard et al. (2003) report an enormous
cross-sectional variance of plant level value added per worker using data from the 1992 US
Census of Manufactures. The standard deviation of the log of value added per worker is
0.75 in the data while their model is able to account for only around half this number. The
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authors argue that imperfect competition and data measurement issues can account for much
of this discrepancy between model and data. In addition, the study assumes xed labour
share across plants so any departures from this assumption would lead to more variations in
the measured dispersion of labour productivity.
In a comprehensive review article on the literature on cross-sectional productivity dif-
ferences, Syverson (2009) documents that the top decile of rms has a level of TFP which
is almost twice as high as the bottom decile. He nds that unobserved inputs such as the
human capital of the labour force, the quality of management and plant level learning by
doingcan account for much of the observed cross-sectional variation in TFP.
This model does not have intangible assets of the sort discussed in Syverson (2009) and
consequently calibrating the model using the enormous productivity di¤erentials identied
in the productivity literature would overestimate the true degree of TFP di¤erences. In
addition, the Kiyotaki-Moore model would need very tight borrowing constraints or a very
small number of high productivity entrepreneurs in order for credit constraints to be binding
if some rms are so much more productive than others. And within the framework we have,
binding credit constraints are the only mechanism for generating cross-sectional di¤erences in
productivity. Aoki et al. (2009) also consider these issues in their calibration of a small open
economy version of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). They argue that a ratio of the productivities
of the two groups of 1:15 is broadly consistent with the empirical evidence and I choose this
number for the baseline case. However I conduct extensive sensititivity analysis on this hard
to pin down parameter because there is very little strong evidence for how to calibrate the
productivity dispersion across rms.
Moving on to the parameters governing labour supply we set ! 1 (the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply) to 3. This is higher than micro-data estimates (references) but is consistent
with choices made in the macro literature. We then pick {, a parameter governing the
disutility of labour to get a value of labour supply as a fraction of workerstime endowment
which is equal to 0:33.
The discount factor , the probability that a highly productive entrepreneur switches to
low productivity , and the ratio of high to low productivity entrepreneurs n are parameters
I pick in order to match three calibration targets - the ratio of tangible assets to GDP,
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aggregate leverage and the leverage of the most indebted decile of rms.
I use data on tangible assets and GDP from the BEA National Accounts in the 1952-2008
period. The concept of tangible assets includes Business and Household Equipment and
Software, Inventories, Business and Household Structures and Consumer Durables. GDP
excludes government value added so it is a private sector output measure.
Aggregate leverage is dened as the average ratio of the value of the debt liabilities of the
non-nancial corporate sector to the total value of assets. Leverage measures can be obtained
from a number of sources. In the US Flow of Funds, aggregate leverage is approximately
equal to 0.5 for the 1948-2008 period. This is broadly consistent with the ndings of den
Haan and Covas (2007) who calculate an average leverage ratio of 0.587 in Compustat data
from 1971 to 2004. Den Haan and Covas (2007a) also examine the leverage of large rms and
nd that it is slightly higher than the average in the Compustat data set. Firms in the top
5% in terms of size have leverage of around 0.6. Den Haan and Covas (2007b) have similar
ndings in a panel of Canadian rms. There the top 5% of rms have leverage of 0.7-0.75
compared to an average of 0.66 for the whole sample. High productivity entrepreneurs in
our economy run larger rms so di¤erences in productivity and therefore leverage could be
one reason for the ndings of Den Haan and Covas (2007a and 2007b). But the perfect
correlation of rm size and leverage that holds in our model will not hold in the data. So if
we are interested in the distribution of rm leverage, the numbers in Den Haan and Covas
will be an underestimate. This is why we pick a target for the average leverage of the top
10% most indebted rms to be equal to 0.75. This number is broadly consistent with the
ndings in Den Haan and Covas.
Table 1 below summarises the calibration targets we match while Table 2 summarises
the baseline parameter values used in the paper.
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Table 1: Calibration targets
Target Value Source
Tangible Assets to GDP = q=
 
Y H + Y L  XH  XL 3.49 BEA National Accounts
Aggregate Leverage =LA = B=
 
q + Y H + Y L

0.50 Flow of Funds
Leverage of indebted rms =LH = B=
 
qK + Y H

0.75 Den Haan-Covas (2007a)
Share of intermediate inputs in gross output =  0.45 BEA National Accounts
Share of capital in GDP = = (1  ) 0.36 BEA National Accounts
Cross sectional productivity dispersion = aH=aL 1.15 Aoki et al. (2009)
Collateralisability of capital =  1.00 Aoki et al. (2009)
Standard deviation of annual real GDP 2.01 BEA National Accounts
Table 2: Summary of baseline model calibration
Parameter Name Parameter Value
 0.896
 0.145
n 0.084
 0.20
 0.45
! 0.33
{ 2.29
pgg 0.80
pbb 0.80
Ah 1.006
Al 0.994
aH=aL 1.15
 1.00
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5.2 Model evaluation
Having chosen parameter values to match the rst moments of the model to those in the
data and to match the volatility of real GDP, in this section we evaluate the model by
analysing how key moments of the model compare to those in the data. All variables have
been detrended using the HP lter (for more details see Appendix G) Table 3 below compares
the second moments of the model relative to the data6. The numbers we focus on is the
standard deviation of annual aggregate non-durable consumption, aggregate labour hours
and the stock market
Table 3: Model second moments
Data Model
c 1.55 2.01
h 1.32 1.25
v 6.06 2.55
Note: c is the standard deviationo of the logarithm of aggregate consumption, h is the standard
deviation of the logarithm of aggregate labour hours, v is the standard deviation of the logarithm of stock
prices
The standard deviation of aggregate labour hours in the model are broadly in line with
those in the data. The model does less well in the other two key dimensions we use in our
evaluation. Aggregate consumption is too volatile relative to the data. This is a feature of
the model that can be improved upon in future work by adding a better means of aggregate
saving. Capital is xed and the only means of aggregate saving for agents in the model is to
purchase intermediate inputs. In addition, due to the low risk free interest rate, workers do
not save and their consumption is as volatile as labour income. In future work I intend to
extend the model by adding capital which does not depreciate fully and which can, therefore,
be accumulated in the aggregate, allowing households to smooth consumption better. The
volatility of the real value of the S&P 500 in the data is also considerably higher than the
volatility of asset prices in the model.
6More details on how the data moments were computed are in Appendix G.
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5.3 Borrowing Constraints and Steady State Productive E¢ ciency
In this subsection we consider what would happen in the steady state (i.e. in the absence of
aggregate shocks) if the government chooses to impose tighter capital requirements (a lower
value of e). Perhaps the biggest welfare cost of tighter borrowing constraints arises because
borrowing constraints reduce the e¢ ciency of the economy. This happens for two reasons.
Firstly, the downpayment requirements on capital acts as a tax on the capital purchases of
high productivity entrepreneurs and distorts their production mix relative to the rst best.
Secondly, borrowing constraints increase the share of low productivity rms in economic
activity, reducing aggregate TFP. Below we explain both of these sources of ine¢ ciency.
5.3.1 Capital requirements and the downpayment taxon high productivity
entrepreneurs
In Appendix H we show that we can write the steady state user cost of capital for high pro-
ductivity entrepreneurs in the tax wedge form popularised by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2007):
uHt = qt  
" et
Rt
+
1  et
RHt+1
#
qt+1
= uLt

1 +  t
e
where the tax is given by the following expression
 t
et = 1  et qt
uLt
  1

1  Rt
RHt+1

(20)
The collateral requirement acts like a tax on the capital purchases of constrained pro-
ducers. The size of the tax is determined by the followign factors. First of all, the tax is
increasing in the required downpayment on capital goods 1   et. This fraction determines
how much of the capital purchase needs to be nanced by expensive own savings as opposed
to cheap external funds. The di¤erence between the valuation of internal funds and the
market price of loans is given by the 1   Rt
RHt+1
term in (20). It arises when the borrowing
constraint leads to a deterioration in consumption smoothing. High productivity entrepre-
neurs experience faster consumption growth making them less willing to save. And because
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the collateral constraint forces them to save, this acts to increase their user cost relative
to unconstrained low productivity agents. Secondly, the tax is increasing in the price to
rent ratio of capital. This is because a high price to rent ratio increases the internal funds
required by a constrained borrower (who needs to have a fraction of the cost of capital as
downpayment) relative to an unconstrained borrower (who e¤ectively faces only the user
cost). The rst row in Table 4 below shows how the downpayment taxvaries with the
value of downpayment requirement. As et - the collateralisability of capital - declines from
1:0 and 0:8, the taxincreases from 0 to 20%.
Interestingly the impact of capital requirements on the real wage is very small due to
two opposing e¤ects. Lower et allows high productivity entrepreneurs to expand production
which boosts TFP and increases wages. But there is another e¤ect. Lower et increases the
user cost of capital and skews the input mix by high productivity entrepreneurs towards
intermediate inputs and labour. The higher labour demand increases the wage. At high
levels of et, the share of production done by the e¢ cient producers is high and the two
e¤ects o¤set each other leaving the real wage broadly unchanged..
As the last four rows of Table 4 show, the decline in the economys e¢ ciency due to
higher capital requirements leads to a fall in the steady state consumption of all groups in
society. Most strongly a¤ected are high productivity entrepreneurs; their consumption (CH)
declines by more than 30% as e falls towards 0:8 from the baseline of 1:0. But other agents
in the economy are negatively a¤ected too. Low productivity entrepreneursconsumption
(CL) falls 10% largely as a result of the lower wealth of these consumers who accumulate less
wealth during previous productive spells due to the e¤ect of capital requirements. Workers
consumption posts a more modest 1% decline largely as a result of the small impact on the
real wage.
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Table 4: Selected rst moments under di¤erent capital requirements
Capital Requirements e = 0:8 e = 0:9 e = 1:0 1st best
 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.00
w 1.582 1.586 1.586 1.744
KH 0.29 0.41 0.69 1.00
TFP 1.048 1.064 1.104 1.15
CE 0.464 0.489 0.549 0.643
CH 0.942 1.122 1.540 0.643
CL 0.427 0.439 0.471 0.643
CW 0.518 0.523 0.523 0.767
Notes:  is the downpayment taxrate, w is the wage rate,KH is the share of the capital stock held by
high productivity entrepreneurs, TFP is aggregate total factor productivity, CE is average entrepreneurs
consumption, CH is average high productivity entrepreneurs consumption, CL is average low productivity
entrepreneurs consumption, CW is average workersconsumption.
5.3.2 Capital requirements and the level of TFP
The aggregate level of TFP in this economy is given by the ratio of aggregate output in the
economy to the inputs that are used in production.
TFPt = At
aH (K)
 
XH
  
HH
1  
+ (1 K)  XL  HL1  
(XH +XL) (HH +HL)1  
In Appendix I we show that aggregate TFP in the economy is given by the following expres-
sion:
TFPt =
1 +Kt

aH (1 +  ())1    1
1 +  ()Kt
The downpayment tax and the existence of ine¢ cient production under binding borrow-
ing constraints endogenously reduces the economys level of TFP. This can be seen in the
last row of Table 5 above. As e declines from unity to 0:8, the share of capital held by high
producitivity entrepreneurs declines from 0:69 to 0:30, bringing about a decline in aggregate
TFP of more than 5%. This is a crucial feature of the Kiyotaki (1998) framework. When
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borrowing constraints bind tightly, not enough funds get into the hands of the high produc-
tivity rms. As a result, the economy operates within the production possibility frontier
because some of the scarce capital input is held by low productivity rms.
5.4 Borrowing Constraints and Aggregate Volatility in the Sto-
chastic Economy
In this subsection we consider how the imposition of capital requirements a¤ect the equilib-
rium of the economy with aggregate uncertainty. Here we focus on the ways in which capital
requirements a¤ect the volatility of aggregate consumption as well as the consumption of
di¤erent groups and link it to the endogenous uctuations in TFP which arise due to the
amplication mechanism.
Leverage leads to a reallocation of capital between high and low productivity entrepre-
neurs over the business cycle. This happens through the standard collateral amplication
mechanism of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which can cause substantial endogenous uctu-
ations in TFP amplifying the normal shocks to technology over the business cycle. The
mechansim which generates this amplication is the following. When the aggregate produc-
tivity state At changes (say, it falls), this reduces the capital price in both the borrowing
constrained and in the rst besteconomy. But whereas in the rst bestworld, there is
very little additional propagation, in the credit constrained (leverage nanced) economy, the
fall in asset prices impacts the wealth of high productivity and low productivity agents dif-
ferently. Because they are leveraged, high productivity entrepreneurs are badly a¤ected and
have to scale down their capital investments because they can no longer a¤ord the required
downpayment as well as the cost of the capital input needed to operate productive projects
with a large capital input. The purchasers of capital are the low productivity entrepreneurs
and consequently the economys aggregate TFP declines as ine¢ cient production expands.
The additional fall in TFP puts further downward pressure on capital prices and on the
wealth and borrowing capacity of high productivity entrepreneurs. This is the amplication
channel of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997): small declines in the economys aggregate technology
can set o¤ a self-reinforcing spiral of falling TFP and asset prices, magnifying the e¤ect of
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the original technology shock. The amplication mechanism is very important because its
quantitative strength will be a crucial determinant of whether capital requirements can be
welfare improving or not.
Table 5: Selected second moments under di¤erent capital requirements
Capital Requirements e = 0:80 e = 0:90 e = 1:00 1st best
y 1.48 1.57 2.01 1.37
q 1.52 1.68 2.55 1.37
c 1.48 1.57 2.01 1.37
w 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.34
TFP 0.53 0.66 0.85 0.60
Note: y is the standard deviation of the log of output, q is the standard deviation of the log of
the capital price, c is the standard deviation of the log of aggregate consumption, TFP is the standard
deviation of the log of aggregate total factor productivity, w is the standard deviation of the log of
the real wage rate.
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) have argued that the amount of amplication in the Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) framework is very small when one assumes concave utility and decreasing
returns to scale in production. They show that large amplication needs a large produc-
tivity gap, a large share of constrained agents in production and substantial reallocation of
collateral in response to shocks. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) nd that, in particular, there
is a trade o¤ between having a large productivity gap and having a lot of production in
the hands of constrained entrepreneurs. This is because they assume decreasing returns to
scale at the plant level. When constrained rms are very small and their output is low they
are much more productive than the larger unconstrained rms. But the downside is that
their share in total output is low. At the other extreme, when constrained rms are large,
their productivity advantage relative to unconstrained ones is small. In both cases, at least
one condition for large amplication is not satised and so the additional volatility from the
model is negligible.
As Table 5 shows, the amplication we obtain from out calibrated version of the Kiyotaki
(1998) model is very substantial. In the baseline case, the standard deviations of TFP and
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output are, respectively, 38% and 45% higher compared to the rst best while the standard
deviation of the capital price is 84% higher. So contrary to the results in Cordoba and
Ripoll (2004) we get quantitatively large amplication from the framework. Our di¤erences
from Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) arise from one main source - our assumption of constant
returns to scale to all factors at the plant level. Even though we have decreasing returns
to the collateral factor (capital), the production function is constant returns in all the three
factors. This means that in our calibration we do not face the trade o¤ between the size
of the productivity gap and the share of constrained producers in economic activity. The
productivity gap is largely driven by the value of aH as well as the downpayment tax ().
It is independent of the level of output at any individual rm. When we add the e¤ects of
leverage (again realistically calibrated to match US data), we get substantial re-allocation
of collateral between high and low productivity entrepreneurs as asset prices uctuate. So
Cordoba and Ripolls conditions for amplication are satised and this explains why our
constrained economy is so much more volatile relative to the rst best. Our results are
similar to those in Vlieghe (2005) who found something very similar in a version of Kiyotaki
(1998) with nominal rigidities. In his model (which also featured constant returns to all fac-
tors) amplication was very substantial showing the potential of the framework to propagate
shocks.
In addition to the amplication of aggregate uctuations, leverage concentrates the ag-
gregate risk in the hands of only a small subset of agents in the economy. When capital
is largely held by high productivity entrepreneurs who nance their capital holdings using
simple debt, risk sharing between the two groups deteriorates. We can see this in Table
6 below which shows the variance of the aggregate consumption of the two groups. This
di¤erence grows as credit constraints are relaxed due to the increasing collateralisability of
capital.
31
Table 6: Consumption volatility for the workers and entrepreneurs7
Capital Requirements e = 0:80 e = 0:90 e = 1:00 1st best
cH 2.48 3.12 5.57 1.37
cL 1.33 1.34 1.52 1.37
cW 1.45 1.50 1.65 1.37
Note: cH is the unconditional standard deviation of the log of the consumption of high productivity
entrepreneurs, cL is the unconditional standard deviation of the log of the consumption of low productivity
entrepreneurs, cL is the unconditional standard deviation of the log of the consumption of workers.
This result is not surprising. The low productivity entrepreneurs hold largely riskless
debt and small positions in risky capital. In contrast, high productivity entrepreneurs hold
leveraged positions in risky capital. This asymmetry in the asset holdings of the two groups
leads to a concentration of the aggregate risk in the economy into the hands of very few (high
productivity) individuals whose consumption uctuates very substantially. Our results are
in line with the ndings of Vissing-Jorgensen and Parker (2009) who nd that the aggregate
risk is borne by a small fraction of high consumption/high income households. Tightening
rmsaccess to borrowing reduces this asymmetry in the riskiness of di¤erent indivdiuals
portfolios and consequently reduces the volatility in their relative consumption levels over
the business cycle.8
5.5 Discussion
In this section we examined the quantitative signicance of four ways in which the credit
constrained economy is distorted relative to the rst best. These distortions, however, do
7Note that these consumption volatilities refer to the standard deviation of the consumption of all agents
who happen to be high or low productivity at a given point in time. They are not the expected standard
deviation of the consumption of the people who are high or low productivity at time 0 when the policy is
decided upon.
Nevertheless we think these numbers are informative of the kind of consumption volatility caused by
aggregate uncertainty. It illustrates the fact that high productivity entrepreneurs face a lot of risks to their
net worth because of leverage and this causes their consumption to be much more volatile ex post.
8In the limit, when no borrowing is allowed and all production is entirely net worth nanced, both types
of agents hold identical portfolios (only productive projects) and risk sharing is perfect.
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not necessarily imply that the economy is constrained ine¢ cient. As long as the government
cannot do anything directly about borrowing constraints, many of these distortions will be
an unavoidable consequence of credit market imperfections.
For example, any deviations of the economys steady state from rst best would be
constrained e¢ cient. The trade o¤between productive e¢ ciency and consumption smoothing
is identical for private individuals and for the government. Private borrowers with good
productive opportunities choose to borrow up to the limit and experience a steeply sloped
consumption path because the rates of return they can earn on productive projects are
much better compared to the cost of debt. The government will make an identical decision
because it can redistribute capital holdings between the two groups and compensate the low
productivity rms for their lost output while still making the high productivity borrowers
better o¤. The only constraint on this redistribution is the collateral constraint, which binds
for the government in the same way as it binds for the laissez faire economy.
In a stochastic environment, the e¢ ciency properties of the competitive equilibrium
change. The collateral amplication mechanism of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduces
feedback e¤ects between asset prices, the net worth of leveraged borrowers and the tightness
of borrowing constraints. When aggregate productivity switches from high to low, asset
prices fall and this has a disproportionately negative e¤ect on the net worth of leveraged
high productivity borrowers. Because part of the capital purchase and the whole of the
intermediate input purchase is non-collateralisable, borrowers need their own net worth in
order to produce on a large scale. Therefore the fall in the net worth of high productivity
borrowers reduces the amount of capital they can invest in production and forces them to
scale down their capital holdings. The low productivity agents absorb the capital sold by the
high productivity ones but only at lower prices. But this fall in the price of capital further
damages the net worth of leveraged rms and forces them to cut their capital holdings even
further. This completes the credit cycle, amplifying and propagating small shocks into
larger uctuations in output, TFP and asset prices.
Where does the ine¢ ciency of private leverage come from? As identied in Lorenzoni
(2008) and Korinek (2009), when collateral constraints bind, the pecuniary externalities we
usually consider harmless from an economic e¢ ciency point of view, begin to interfere with
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the allocative e¢ ciency of the economy. The forced sales of leveraged borrowers depress asset
prices and tighten the credit constraints of all other constrained borrowers, forcing them to
sell assets themselves9.
6 The Model Economy under Capital Requirements
In this section we turn to the main question of this research: are private leverage decisions
optimal from a social point of view? From the work of Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2009)
we know that, qualitatively, the answer is no. Here we examine whether, quantitatively,
the ine¢ ciency is large or small.
We assume that capital requirements are chosen by a benevolent government who max-
imises a social welfare function which weights the values of all agents in the economy. The
government is subject to the same collateral and budget constraints facing private agents. So
any di¤erences in private and social leverage choices are due to the market price externality
discussed above.
6.1 The Governments Problem
The government optimises the coe¢ cient on a simple state contingent capital requirement
rule et = min exp  i0 + i1 ln dt + i2 lnZt ;  (21)
in order to maximise the following social welfare function
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9But although such pecuniary externalities exist they are not always quantitatively signicant. For
example, Guerrieri (2007) examines the constrained e¢ ciency of a competitive labour market search model
with private information and limited commitment. In her model, workers take the value of the outside
unemployment option as given while the planner recognises that it is endogenous because the expected
value of job matches a¤ects the continuation value of the unemployed. Although Guerrieri (2007) identies
this very interesting source of ine¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium, she nds that, quantitatively, the
externality in question is very small.
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where & iE is the Pareto-Negishi weight on entrepreneur i while &W is the Pareto-Negishi
weight on the workers. We do not consider any other policy instruments.10 Note that the
capital requirements et is constrained by the exogenously given limit .
et 6 
In other words the government has no advantage in enforcing debt repayment over the
private sector and therefore it cannot choose looser capital requirements than the market.
The policy rule (21) allows the capital requirement to undergo mean shifts as the aggregate
productivity state changes. Capital requirements also can respond to changes in the other
aggregate state variables - total wealth wt and the share of wealth held by high productivity
people dt. Once the government has chosen capital requirements, the collateral constraint
in the regulated economy becomes:
bt 6 etEtqt+1kt (23)
Private agents then perform exactly the same maximisation problem as in the unregulated
economy, but the collateral constraint they now face may be tighter if et <  in some states
of the world.
In Appendix C we show that the value function of the two types of entrepreneurs at time
0 depends on the net present value of future expected log rates of return on wealth as well
10We do not solve a social planning problem because the collateral constraints in our economy depend on
prices and these do not admit to a simple closed form solution in the same way as in Lorenzoni (2008) and
Korinek (2009).
In future work, we intend to solve for the full Ramsay problem. We do not do this here because it
complicates the solution of the model. At the same time the policy we consider does capture a lot of
intuitive features about the way capital requirement policy may be implemented. It is fully state contingent
and it is conducted under commitment because the government chooses the i coe¢ cients at the beginning
of time and sticks to them for ever.
Our policy rule is, therefore, similar to the Optimal non-inertial planpopularised by Woodford (2003)
because it is conducted under commitment (the central bank opimises its coe¢ cients in a once and for all
fashion) but without responding to lagged variables (which is what the optimal Ramsay commitment policy
does).
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as the logarithm of current nancial wealth.
V i (X0) = '
i (X0) +
ln z0
1   ; i = H;L
where 'i (X0) is the net present value of future rates of return on wealth and z0 is time 0
nancial wealth.
'i (Xt) = ln (1  ) +  ln 
1   + maxxt;kt;ht;bt Et
"
ln
 
Rit+1

1   + '
i (Xt+1)
#
We assume a particular initial wealth distribution in which all high and all low productivity
entrepreneurs have an initial level of wealth equal to the group average in the no regulation
steady state. This allows us to consider the following social welfare function which weights
the utilities of the three groups by the inverse of their marginal utility of consumption
evaluated at the initial wealth distribution (more details in Appendix K):
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(24)
where 'H (X0) and 'L (X0) are the NPVs of future expected log rates of return on wealth
for the two groups of entrepreneurs while ZH0 and Z
L
0 are the initial wealth levels of the high
and low productivity entrepreneurs.
6.2 When is private leverage excessive?
The benevolent government chooses and commits to a time invariant capital requirement
function et which maximises social welfare (24). The government cares about three things in
(24). It wants to maximise the Pareto weighted average of the net present expected value of
log returns on wealth for the two types of entrepreneurs. These are the the 'H0 and '
L
0 terms
in the social welfare function. But it also wants to maximise the welfare of workers which
depends on the average level and volatility of real wages. Finally, the government cares about
the current nancial wealth of entrepreneurs too. It knows that any policy announcement
will immediately be reected in the capital price, impacting on the wealth of the two groups
and it takes this into account when designing the optimal policy. In the next section we will
compute numerically how these determinants of the welfare of the three groups change as
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we vary capital requirements. Then we will see whether the government can increase welfare
relative to the market.
Here however we try to add a little more intuition by considering how the capital re-
quirement choices of the government di¤er from those of private individuals in more detail.
We do this by looking at what choices the government would make if allowed to choose et
in order to maximise the log expected portfolio return of the two groups of entrepreneurs
as well as the log wage rate of workers. We compute the governments rst order condition
for each groups portfolio problem and evaluating them at private leverage choices lmt . This
exercise will be useful for two reasons. First of all it identies any sources of re-distribution
between the two groups as capital requirements are tightened. But secondly, it pinpoints
where the externalities discussed by Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2009) might occur in
our framework.
6.2.1 High productivity entrepreneurs
Starting with the portfolio problem of high productivity entrepreneurs we nd how RHt+1 is
a¤ected by tightening collateral requirements around the private optimum lmt
@RHt+1
et = lmt 
@ et  @$
H
t
@ et  EtHt+1   1 $Ht 2Rt+1 
 
$Ht
2
2
@
 
2Rt+1

@ et +

@Et
H
t+1
@ et + @ lnRt@ et

(25)
Here Ht+1 is the excess return on leveraged production for high productivity entrepreneurs,
which was dened in equation (11). The value of (25) depends strongly on whether bor-
rowing constraints bind or not in the current period. When borrowing constraints bind, the
entrepreneurs portfolio hits the constraint and the private rst order condition with respect
to the share of the risky asset (equation (12)) holds with inequality:
Et
H
t+1   1 $Ht 2Rt+1 > 0
But the government takes an additional amplication e¤ect into account. This is the
($Ht )
2
2
@(2Rt+1)
@ et term in equation (25). It takes into account the endogeneity of the variance
of the portfolio rate of return for high productivity entrepreneurs. The more they borrow
to invest into risky assets, the larger the impact of capital price shocks on their rates of
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return on wealth. And this is where the amplication mechanism generates the externality
identied in Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2009). When capital prices fall, leveraged en-
trepreneurs make low returns on wealth and this forces them to sell capital because they no
longer have the net worth to purchase the non-collateralised inputs needed to support a large
capital input into production. The capital sales can only be absorbed by low productivity
rms at lower prices, leading to another round of forced capital sales by credit constrained
entrepreneurs.
But the government also recognises the fact that its policy instrument has its costs.
Raising the downpayment requirement on capital acts like a tax on high productivity en-
trepreneurs, which reduces their excess return on production:
@EtHt+1
@ et > 0. So when capital
requirements are tightened, the excess return on high productivity projects is reduced due
to their distorted input mix. Partially o¤setting that, the risk free rate increases when the
government tightens credit limits: @ lnRt
@ et < 0. But overall, tighter capital requirements leads
to a lower rate of return on wealth for high productivity entrepeneurs. Finally, high pro-
ductivity entrepreneurs have substantial capital positions which depreciate in value when
regulation is introduced. This has a negative e¤ect on their welfare.
6.2.2 Low productivity entrepreneurs
Moving on to the portfolio of low productivity entrepreneurs we have the following rst
order condition, which determine the way the capital requirements for high productivity
entrepreneurs impact on the log rate of return on wealth for the low types:
@ lnRLt+1
et = lmt 
@ et  @$
L
t
@ et  EtLt+1   1 $Lt 2rt+1 
 
$Lt
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2
@
 
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
@ et + @Et
L
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(26)
Capital requirements will a¤ect low productivity types indirectly because they will reduce
the available supply of the risk free asset and force them to invest more of their net worth
in production. This is the rst term in (26). But in addition, the volatility of the aggregate
economy will decline and this will reduce the variance of the returns on the risky asset
((
$Lt )
2
2
@(2rt+1)
@ et ). The excess return on the risky asset for low productivity types will also
change (
@EtLt+1
@ et ) depending on whether the overall portfolio has become riskier or safer as a
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result of the policy change. Finally risk free rates will change as the economy becomes more
regulated.
For unconstrained low productivity entrepreneurs most of the terms in (26) are zero.
Et
L
t+1   1 $Lt 2rt+1 = 0 from optimal portfolio choice. Because the low productivity type
prices assets in our economy, any change in the volatility of returns will be reected in the
excess returns demanded in equilibrium. This means that  ($
L
t )
2
2
@(2rt+1)
@ et + @
L
t+1
@ et = 0: more
volatile returns will be accompanied by a higher excess return leaving the welfare of low
productivity entrepreneurs una¤ected.
There is an interesting di¤erence between the way the government treats the portfolios
problems of the two groups. In the case of the high productivity agents, the government was
concerned with the welfare consequences of the market price externality which increased the
value of 2Rt+1- the variance of the log rate of return on the risky asset for high productivity
entrepreneurs. But in this case changes in 2rt+1 - the variability of the log excess return on
the risky asset for the low types - did not represent any allocative ine¢ ciency.
This di¤erence arises because low productivity entrepreneurs are always unconstrained in
their portfolio choice so, on the margin, any increase in the volatility of capital prices due to
the excessive leverage of other entrepreneurs is compensated in equilibrium by higher excess
returns. For the low productivity types the behaviour of the productive types represents
a pure pecuniary externality with no consequences for allocative e¢ ciency. In contrast,
high productivity entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained (at least in some states of the
world) and the tightness of the borrowing constraint depends on the level of asset prices. So
the pecuniary externalities caused by the forced capital sales by leveraged entrepreneurs in
downturns do have consequences for the allocative e¢ ciency of the economy. By tightening
borrowing constraints for everyone else, forced sales exert an externality the benevolent
government should be concerned with correcting.
Because most of the terms in (26) drop out, the expected net present value of future
returns for low productivity types is driven largely by what is happening to the log of risk
free rates.
@ lnRLt+1
et = lmt 
@ et  @ lnRt@ et
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Because tightening collateral requirements in the Kiyotaki (1998) model reduces aggregate
TFP and pushes down on capital prices, the lower user cost of capital increases the rate of
return on production for low productivity types and, by arbitrage, increases the risk free
rate. This e¤ect raises the welfare of low productivity entrepreneurs.
But there are other factors which reduce the welfare of low productivity entrepreneurs.
First of all, the continuation value of low productivity agents 'Lt partly depends on the
value of a possible future high productivity opportunity 'Ht and as we have seen in the
previous subsection, this can be reduced by regulation. But secondly, as capital regulation
is tightened, this depresses capital prices which form a part of all entrepreneursportfolios.
So the wealth terms of (24) will fall. Overall, the welfare of the unproductive will rise if they
do not hold much capital (hence the loss of wealth from lower prices is small) and if they
are not very likely to transit to the high productivity state (hence the fall in the value of
productive opportunities does not a¤ect them much).
6.2.3 Workers
Workersperiod welfare is determined by the log of the real wage.
@ lnwt
et = lmt 
@ et
As the results in Table 5 above showed, tightening capital requirements in relatively well
developed nancial systems (with a high value of et) resulted in slightly higher real wages
and higher welfare for workers. However, tightening collateral requirements in a less well
developed nancial system resulted in lower wages for workers.
To summarise. We can see that introducing capital requirements may improve the wel-
fare entrepreneurs and workers although this is by no means guarranteed. When collateral
requirements are already binding at the time of capital requirement reform, such a reform
may not be welfare increasing despite the existence of externalities. This is because the bind-
ing collateral constraint makes the policy instrument (tightening collateral constraints even
further in some states of the world) a very distortionary one. In order for the government to
distort an already distorted economy even further, two things have to be true: the collateral
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amplication mechanism must be very powerful and/or private individuals must care very
much about consumption volatility. We now proceed to check whether numerically this is is
the case or not in our economy.
7 Optimal Collateral Requirements and Welfare
7.1 Numerical Results
In this section we use numerical simulations to compare the market and the governments
choices of the collateral requirements on capital.We do this under di¤erent states of the
nancial system as measuared by  - the fraction of capital which is collateralisable11. This
is done in Table 7 below. The rst row of the table shows that rms always choose to invest
up to the debt limit in the competitive equilibrium. The second row shows the governments
choice of capital requirement as it tries to maximise the social welfare function (24). The
capital requirement turns out to be invariably equal to the privately permissible maximum
leverage and, unsurprisingly, private agents borrow the same amount as they do in the
unregulated economy (shown in the third row of the table). This is the main result of this
paper - when credit constraints bind tightly due to a substantial productivity di¤erential
between the two types of entrepreneurs in our economy, the government wants to encourage
investment all the way to the incentive-compatibility determined borrowing limit .
Table 7: The governments collateral requirement choices
 = 0:80  = 0:90  = 1:00
E (lmt ) 0.80 0.90 1.00
E
et 0.80 0.90 1.00
E (lgt ) 0.80 0.90 1.00
Note: E (lmt ) is the average private choice of debt as a fraction of tangible assets in the Laissez Faire
economy, E
et is the average capital requirement in the regulated economy and E (lgt ) is the average
11In each we recalibrated the model to match the target discussed in the calibration section. These are
(1) aggregate leverage, (2) leverage of the most indebted decile of rms, (3) the ratio of tangible assets to
GDP, (4) the fraction of time spent working and (5) the standard deviation of real GDP.
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private choice of debt as a fraction of tangible assets in the regulated economy.
Table 8 below tries to delve a little deeper into the determinants of welfare for individual
groups as well as the aggregate economy in order to see how they they are a¤ected by changes
in capital requirements. The table looks at the change in a number of measures of welfare
from the imposition of a capital requirement et =  0:01 in all states of the world. Because
we are interested in how the initial state of the nancial system a¤ects the incentives of
the government to regulate leverage, we repeat our exercise for several nancial systems,
represented by di¤erent values of the maximum collateral limit .
So for example, the rst column of the table takes an economy where the state of the
nancial system can collateralise up to a 0:8 fraction of capital values. To see the local
incentives for the government to regulate we consider the welfare e¤ects of the imposition of
a capital requirement et = 0:79.
Table 8: Capital requirements and welfare
 = 0:80  = 0:90  = 1:00
Welfare of high productivity entrepreneurs
1004 ln'H0 -0.33 -0.32 -0.23
1004 lnZH0 -1.06 -1.91 -4.15
1004 lnV H0 -0.33 -0.58 -1.15
Welfare of high productivity entrepreneurs
1004 ln'L0 0.37 0.58 1.11
1004 lnZL0 -0.14 -0.32 -0.71
1004 lnV L0 0.05 0.03 0.04
Workerswelfare
1004 lnV W0 -0.09 -0.02 0.14
Aggregate welfare
1004 lnV0 -0.18 -0.23 -0.33
Note: All variables in the table measure the percentage change in the relevant component of welfare from
a tightening of collateral requirements by 0.01 (or 1% of the value of tangible assets). 4 ln'H0 is the change
in the net present value of future expected log rates of return on wealth for high productivity entrepreneurs,
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4 ln'L0 is the change in the net present value of future expected log rates of return on wealth for low
productivity entrepreneurs, 4 lnwH0 is the wealth change for high productivity entrepreneurs, 4 lnwL0 is
the wealth change for low productivity entrepreneurs,4 lnV H0 is the welfare change for high productivitiy
entrepreneurs, 4 lnV L0 is the welfare change for low productivitiy entrepreneurs, 4 lnV0 is the aggregate
welfare change.
Starting with the baseline case of  = 1 (the third column of the table) we can see that
changing capital requirements a little in the neighbourhood of the competitive equilibrium
reduces aggregate welfare by 0:3%. But this masks a number of di¤erent competing e¤ects
on welfare. Starting with the high productivity entrepreneurs, the second row of the table
shows that the expected net present value of future log returns on wealth ('H0 ) decreases by
just under 0:2%. There is also a 4% decline in wealth (ZH0 ) and causes a 1% drop in the
welfare of high productivity entrepreneurs (V H0 ). Further down the  = 1 column we have
the components of welfare for low productivity entrepreneurs. The expected net present
value of future rates of return ('L0 ) increases by around 1% driven by the higher safe rate of
return. Lower asset prices depress the wealth of this group (ZL0 ) which falls by 0:7%. The
e¤ect of higher rates of return on wealth dominates, leading to a 0:04% increase in welfare
(V L0 ). Workerswelfare (V
W
0 ) also rises by a small amount driven by a small rise in the real
wage and a decline in the volatility of real wages.
The cases of  = 0:9 and  = 0:8 (the rst and second column of the Table) are qual-
itatively similar to the baseline case though all the magnitudes get progressively smaller
in absolute value as the economy gets more and more distorted at lower levels of nancial
development. Appendix L contains a number of other sensitivity checks we performed in
order to be sure of the robustness of the no regulationresult. We found that our results
were robust to di¤erent values of the productivity di¤erential aH as well as to the form of
the borrowing constraint.
7.2 Discussion
Our numerical results show that the capital requirement is a very blunt instrument, which
is best left unused in the context of our model and calibration. The main losers from tighter
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regulation of private leverage are the high productivity entrepreneurs who nd that their
access to borrowing is reduced with detrimental e¤ects on their steady state consumption
and welfare. On the positive side, as the results in the penultimate row of Table 8 shows,
the volatility in their consumption declines very sharply. This is because reduced leverage
improves both consumption smoothing over the idiosyncratic productivity cycle as well as risk
sharing over the business cycle. But the benecial impact of greater consumption stability
are insu¢ cient to generate a welfare improvement.
Low productivity entrepreneurs also lose out though by a smaller margin. For them,
capital regulation represents a ner balance. On the one hand they gain because the reduced
access to credit reduces capital prices and boosts the rate of return they earn on their own
production. The consumption is also smoother due to the reduced volatility of consumption
over the productivity cycle as well as the business cycle. But these gains are relatively small
because low productivity entrpreneurs are not leveraged and their consumption is already
smooth. On the other hand, lower wealth due to poorer borrowing opportunities and lower
asset prices a¤ects them too.
Taken as a whole, the economy is made worse o¤by capital requirements. This is because
the productivity reducing e¤ect of regulation turns out to have a larger impact on welfare
compared to its impact in terms of greater macro-economic stability. This suggests that one
reason for the surprising result of this paper is that private agents value average consumption
a lot more than they value consumption stability. One simple way to test this hypothesis is to
examine the premium on risky assets in our economy. This is done in Table 9 below, which
shows the di¤erence between the expected return on the risky asset for low productivity
entrepreneurs and the risk free rate. We focus on low productivity entrepreneurs because
they are unconstrained and therefore they price assets in our economy.
Table 9: The risk premium under di¤erent nancial systems
 = 0:80  = 0:90  = 1:00
100
 
Etr
k
t+1  Rt

0.0010 0.0015 0.0020
Note: 0.01 denotes 1 basis point.
The table shows that the risk premium is very small - less than 1bp for the calibration we
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consider. Put another way, low productivity entprepreneurs strongly prefer excess returns
to smooth returns. It is therefore clear why the government nds that it cannot improve
on the competitive allocation. The pecuniary externality results in excessive volatility of
consumption and asset prices while the policy response we consider has its own costs in
terms of the level of output and consumption. Consumers in this model do not nd such a
trade o¤ advantageous.
Again, note that an absence of amplication in the Kiyotaki (1998) model is not the
reason for this result. Contrary to the ndings of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) we nd that
there is substantial amplication with the standard deviation of output and TFP around
40% higher than the rst bestand the standard deviation of consumption and asset prices
more than 80% higher than the rst best. This shows that the model can magnify the
e¤ects of shocks but consumers do not care su¢ cient about this to be willing to pay the
costs of the regulation.
There are at least three reasons for this. First of all, the assumption of log utility limits
entrepreneursrisk aversion and the amount of steady state consumption they are willing
to give up in order to have a smooth consumption prole over time. This reduces the
costs of weak risk sharing and consumption smoothing in our economy and therefore makes
regulation (which improves both risk sharing and consumption smoothing) less desirable.
Secondly, aggregate shocks are small. The high productivity state alternates between values
0:6% above or below steady state. This is consistent with aggregate uctuations in developed
economies during the recent Great Moderationperiod. It remains to be seen whether the
volatility of technology shocks picks up following the 2008 Lehmans Crisis.
Thirdly, the nature of borrowing in this model is entirely constrained e¢ cient. The ow
of funds between borrowers and lenders serves to boost productivity and benet everyone.
There is no misalocation of resources such as might arise if lenders or borrowers make mis-
takes in allocating credit; there are no defaults and no bankruptcy costs associated with
default. So perhaps it is unsurprising that regulation cannot help in this environment: we
have made its task relatively di¢ cult.
These considerations introduce many possible avenues for future work. Examining the
robustness of the no regulationresult to di¤erent preferences is one obvious extension I am
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already working on. But examining other economic environments is also a promising avenue
in studying the question of whether and how capital requirements can improve social welfare.
8 Conclusions
This paper aims to assess quantitatively the extent to which private leverage choices are
ine¢ cient from a social point of view. We found that, to a very close approximation, these
choices are e¢ cient. In the Kiyotaki-Moore framework credit constraints bind because lim-
ited commitment makes the nancing of productive opportunities more di¢ cult. Thus al-
though leverage introduces a certain degree of nancial fragility into the economy, it also
allows the funding of high value added activities which, on average, allow society to enjoy a
higher level of output and consumption.
So we nd that regulation has a number of costs and benets for economic agents. The
main benets involve reducing the ine¢ cient volatility of output and consumption which
arises from the workings of the collateral amplication mechanism. In the laissez faire
equilibrium individual borrowers decide to borrow up to the debt limit in order to take
advantage of attractive productive opportunities. They know that when aggregate shocks
hit, leverage will magnify the e¤ect of asset prices on balance sheets and force them to sell
productive assets at a time when the price is already low. But atomistic agents take the low
price in downturns as given even though the amount of asset sales and the size of the price
fall are closely linked. The more assets are sold by leveraged high productivity entrepreneurs
the more the price falls because the only buyers are the unleveraged low productivity types.
This exerts downward pressure on the aggregate e¢ ciency of the economy and depresses
asset prices even further tightening credit constraints even more. It is binding borrowing
constraints that make the usually harmless pecuniary externalities between di¤erent agents
important for allocative e¢ ciency.
But regulation has substantial costs too. When borrowing constraints bind, not enough
funds ow from low to high productivity entrepreneurs and this reduces average TFP and
consumption over time. Imposing tighter collateral requirements further squeezes the ow
of credit and further reduces its average productive e¢ ciency even though it makes it more
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stable as a result.
The social choice between the level and the volatility of consumption is largely driven by
the preferences of economic agents as well as the marginal rate of transformation between
the level and volatility of consumption. In our calibration we nd that economic agents
do not care about volatility as much as they care about the level of consumption. This is
clearly demonstrated by the low premium on risky assets (below 1bp). In addition, capital
requirements reduce volatility at too high a cost in terms of average e¢ ciency. Consequently,
the benevolent government chooses not to regulate nance in our model economy.
In future research I want to explore the robustness of this result. One obvious extension is
to change the structure of the model in order to generate a more realistic equity risk premium,
for example by incorporating the Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and an environment of long
run consumption risk. A high equity premium indicates that private investors are very
concerned about risk. So an environment with a high equity premium is more likely to be
one in which the imposition of capital requirements is optimal.
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A Solving for the consumption function
Suppose the entrepreneur has optimally chosen her capital, labour and intermediate inputs
and purchases/short sales of the risk free security. This means that she can earn a state
contingent rate of return on invested wealth of Rt+1. The rst order condition for optimal
consumption then becomes:
1
ct
= Et

Rt+1
1
ct+1

We guess that the entrepreneur consumes a xed fraction of her available resources:
ct = (1  ) zt
where zt is the entrepreneurs wealth. This means that
zt+1 = Rt+1zt
Substituting into the consumption Euler equation we have:
1
(1  ) zt = Et

Rt+1
1
(1  ) zt+1

= Et

Rt+1
1
(1  ) Rt+1zt

=
1
(1  ) zt
This conrms our initial guessed consumption function.
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B Solving for the rate of return on wealth of a high
productivity entrepreneur
We start with the ow of funds constraint of the agent.
ct + wtht + xt + qtkt   bt
Rt
= yt + qtkt 1   bt 1
From the conditions for optimal production (4) and (5) we know that
xt = (1  )uHt kt=
and
wtht = (1    )uHt kt=
Then if entrepreneurs borrow lt 6  of the expected value of collateral, this allows us to solve
for their debt choice:
bt 6 ltEtqt+1kt
The entrepreneurs total saving is given by:
wtht + xt + qtkt   bt
Rt
=

qt + (1  )uHt = 
ltEtqt+1
Rt

kt
This will deliver the following level of wealth in the following period:
wt+1 = yt+1 + qt+1kt   bt
=
h 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1   ltEtqt+1
i
kt
The entrepreneurs rate of return on total wealth invested is given by:
RHt+1 =
yt+1 + qt+1kt   bt
xt+1 + qtkt   btRt
=
 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1   ltEtqt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =  (lt=Rt)Etqt+1
C Solving for the value function
The value function of an entrepreneur is:
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V (zt; at; Xt) = max
xt;kt;ht;bt;ct
fln ct + EtV (zt+1; at+1; Xt+1)g (27)
= max
xt;kt;ht;bt
fln (1  ) + lnwt + EtV (zt+1; at+1; Xt+1)g (28)
Guess that the solution is of the form
V (zt; at; Xt) = ' (at; Xt) +
ln zt
1  
This implies that:
' (at; Xt) +
ln zt
1   = maxxt;kt;ht;bt

ln (1  ) + ln zt + Et

' (at+1; Xt+1) +
ln zt+1
1  

= max
xt;kt;ht;bt

ln (1  ) + ln zt + 
1  Et [' (at+1; Xt+1) + ln (Rt+1zt)]

=

ln (1  ) +  ln 
1   +

1  Et

max
xt;kt;ht;bt
[ln (Rt+1)] + ' (at+1; Xt+1)

+
ln zt
1  

Equating coe¢ cients we get the expression for the intercept of the value function:
' (at; Xt) = ln (1  ) +  ln 
1   +

1   maxxt;kt;ht;btEt [[ln (Rt+1)] + ' (at+1; Xt+1)]
The above expression shows that the agent has to choose productive inputs and borrowing
so as to maximise the expected log rate of return on wealth in each period.
So the value of an entrepreneur in our economy depends on the net present value of
expected log returns on the optimal portfolio as well as the log of current nancial wealth.
D Solving for the rate of return on wealth of a low
productivity entrepreneur
We start with the ow of funds constraint of the agent.
ct + wtkt + xt + qtkt +
bt
Rt
= yt + qtkt 1 + bt 1
From the condition for optimal production (4) and (5) we know that
xt = (1  )uLt kt=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and
wtht = (1    )uLt kt=
The entrepreneurs total saving is given by:
wtht + xt + qtkt +
bt
Rt
=
 
qt + (1  )uLt =

kt +
bt
Rt
This will deliver the following level of wealth in the following period:
wt+1 = yt+1 + qt+1kt + bt
=
h
(At+1=)w
+ 1
t
 
uLt
1 
+ qt+1
i
kt + bt
The entrepreneurs rate of return on total wealth invested is given by:
RLt+1 =
yt+1 + qt+1kt + bt
wtht + xt + qtkt +
bt
Rt
=
h
(At+1=)w
+ 1
t
 
uLt
1 
+ qt+1
i
kt + bt
(qt + (1  )uLt =) kt + bt
Imposing market clearing in the capital and debt markets and recognising that all low pro-
ductivity entrepreneurs chose the same portfolio, we get the following equilibrium rate of
return on wealth for the low type:
RLt+1 =
h
(At+1=)w
+ 1
t
 
uLt
1 
+ qt+1
i
(1 Kt) + ltEtqt+1Kt
(qt + (1  )uLt =) (1 Kt) + ltEtqt+1Kt=Rt
where Kt is the aggregate capital-holding of the high productivity entrepreneurs.
E Approximating the optimal portfolio problem as a
mean variance utility problem
The entrepreneurs portfolio problem involves maximising the log return on his portfolio of
assets. The portfolio can be written as the weighted sum of the return on the risky asset
and the rate of return on the safe asset
Rit+1 = $
i
t
"
(At+1a
i=)w+ 1t (u
i
t)
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uit=
#
+
 
1 $it

Rt (29)
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Let
Ri = max
$it
Et lnR
i
t+1
denote the maximum value of the expected log portfolio return. Using the approximation
lnEtx  Et lnx  1
2
var(lnx) (30)
we can write the portfolio problem as a mean-variance utility maximisation problem.
E.1 High Productivity Entrepreneurs
For high productivity entrepreneurs the (29) expression above can be written as follows:
RHt+1 = $
H
t
" 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =
#
+
 
1 $Ht

Rt
= Rt +$
H
t
" 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =
 Rt
#
= Rt
(
1 +$Ht
" 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =
=Rt   1
#)
 Rt

1 +$Ht

Ht+1   1
	
where
Ht+1 =
 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =
=Rt
Taking logs and using the approximation ln (1 + x)  x for small x we have
lnRHt+1  lnRt +$Ht

Ht+1   1

Applying the approximation (30) we have:
RH  max
$Ht

lnEtR
H
t+1  
1
2
var
 
lnRHt+1

= max
$Ht

lnRt + ln
 
1 +$Ht
 
Et
H
t+1   1
  1
2
var
 
lnRt + ln
 
1 +$Ht
 
Ht+1   1

 max
$Ht

lnRt +$
H
t
 
Et
H
t+1   1
  1
2
var
 
lnRt +$
H
t
 
Ht+1   1

 max
$Ht
"
lnRt +$
H
t
 
Et
H
t+1   1
   $Ht 2
2
2Rt+1
#
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Dene
 Ht+1 =
 
aH=
  
uHt
1 
as output per e¢ ciency unit of capital at time t + 1 for high productivity entrepreneurs.
Then the variance of the risky assets rate of return is given by:
2Rt+1 =
 
 Ht+1
qt + (1  )uHt =
!2
2A +
 
 Ht+1
qt + (1  )uHt =
!
Aqt+1 +

1
qt + (1  )uHt =
2
2qt+1
=
 
 Ht+1
2
2A +  
H
t+1
 
qt + (1  )uHt =

Aqt+1 + 
2
qt+1
(qt + (1  )uHt =)2
where 2A is the variance of the technology shock, Aqt+1 is the conditional covariance of the
technology shock and the capital price and 2qt+1 is the conditional variance of the capital
price.
E.2 Low Productivity Entrepreneurs
Analogously with the previous subsection we learn that the log rate of return on wealth for
low productivity agents can be approximated by:
lnRLt+1  lnRt +$Lt

Lt+1   1

where
Lt+1 =
(At+1=)
 
uLt
1 
+ qt+1
qt + (1  )uLt =
=Rt
Then we can approximate the expected log rate of return on wealth of low productivity
agents by the following expression:
RL  max
$Lt

lnEtR
L
t+1  
1
2
var
 
lnRLt+1

 max
$Lt
"
lnRt +$
L
t
 
Et
L
t+1   1
   $Lt 2
2
2rt+1
#
Dene
 Lt+1 = (1=)
 
uLt
1 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as output per e¢ ciency unit of capital at time t+1 for low productivity entrepreneurs. Then
the variance of the risky assets rate of return is given by:
2rt+1 =
 
 Lt+1
qt + (1  )uLt =
!2
2A +
 
 Lt+1
qt + (1  )uLt =
!
Aqt+1 +

1
qt + (1  )uLt =
2
2qt+1
=
 
 Lt+1
2
2A +  
L
t+1
 
qt + (1  )uLt =

Aqt+1 + 
2
qt+1
(qt + (1  )uLt =)2
Again, just like in the previous subsection, the variance of the risky rate of return for the low
productivity is driven by 2A - the variance of the technology shock, Aqt+1 - the conditional
covariance of the technology shock and the capital price and 2qt+1 - the conditional variance
of the capital price.
F The Frictionless Benchmark
F.1 The Problem of Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs solve the following problem
max
ct;xt
Et
1X
t=0
t ln cet+s
subject to the resource constraint:
cet + xt + ut + wth
d
t +
X
s
bst
Rst+1
=
aHAt


xt 1

 
ht 1
1    
1  
+ bt 1
Here we have already taken into account the fact that only high productivity entrepreneurs
will produce in equilibrium and the entire capital supply will be used in production.
P
s
bst
Rst+1
are the entrepreneurs net purchases (or sales) of Arrow securities at price 1=Rst+1 from
workers. The rst order conditions are as follows:
(1) Investment
xt =


ut
(2) Labour demand
wth
d
t =
1    

ut
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(3) Arbitrage between production and Arrow securities
Rst+1 =
aHAst+1


xt 1

 
ht 1
1    
1  
(4) Entrepreneursconsumption function
cet = (1  )
"
aHAt


xt 1

 
ht 1
1    
1  
+ bt 1
#
F.2 The Problem of Workers
Workers have the following preferences
max
cwt ;ht
Et
1X
s=0
t ln

cwt   {
h1+!t
1 + !

subject to the resource constraint:
cwt +
X
s
bst
Rst+1
= bt 1 + wtht
First order conditions are given by:
1
cwt   { h
1+!
t
1+!
= s
Rst+1
cwst+1   { (
hst+1)
1+!
1+!
and
wt = {h!t (31)
We can derive the consumption function of the workers as follows. Dene:
ect = cwt   { h1+!t1 + !
= cwt   {
(wt={)
1+!
!
1 + !
and
ewt = wtht   { h1+!t
1 + !
= wt (wt={)
1
!   { (wt={)
1+!
!
1 + !
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Then redene the inter-temporal budget constraint using ect and ewt:
ect +X
s
bst
Rst+1
= bt 1 + ewt
and the Euler equation:
1ect = sR
s
t+1ect+1
This problem now looks like the standard consumption-savings problem with log utility. The
consumption function is: ect = (1  ) (Ht + bt 1)
where
Ht = ewt + EtHt+1
Rt+1

is the human wealth of the worker. The workersaggregate consumption function is therefore
given by:
cwt = (1  ) (Ht + bt 1) + {
(wt={)
1+!
!
1 + !
Aggregate consumption in the economy is given by:
cwt + c
e
t = (1  ) (Ht + qt + Yt) + {
(wt={)
1+!
!
1 + !
F.3 The full set of aggregate equilibrium conditions
Aggregate output
Yt =
aHAt

u1 t w
+ 1
t
Market clearing
(1  ) (Ht + qt + Yt) + { (wt={)
1+!
!
1 + !
+


ut =
aHAt

u1 t w
+ 1
t
Human wealth
Ht = wt (wt={)
1
!   { (wt={)
1+!
!
1 + !
+ Et

Ht+1
Rt+1

Price of capital
qt = ut + Et

qt+1
Rt+1

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Arrow security price
Rt+1 = a
HAtu
 
t w
+ 1
t
Labour demand
wt (wt={)
1
! =
1    

ut
G Data Denitions and Sources
G.1 Computing the share of capital in private value added
We compute the share of capital in private value
e  
1  
added following the method in Cooley and Prescott (1995). We dene unambiguous capital
income (Y U) as the sum of [] and ambiguous capital income (Y A) as Proprietors income. We
assume that the share of capital in ambiguous capital income is equal to its share in total
national income. All series are obtained from the BEA national accounts. Then the share
of capital in total income (Y ) is dened as the sum of unambiguous capital income and the
capital share of ambiguous capital income:
eY = Y U + eY A
Hence e = Y U
Y   Y A
G.2 Computing  the share of intermediate inputs in gross output
We use the BEA Industrial Accounts to compute this parameter. The Industrial Accounts
produces sector by sector input output tables, showing the value added and gross output of
each sector. This allows us to compute the share of intermediate inputs for each sector. The
aggregate share of intermediate inputs can be obtained by averaging across all the sectors.
Weighting di¤erent sectors by their weight in aggregate gross output gave almost identical
results.
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G.3 Computing the ratio of tangible assets to GDP
We compute the economys stock of tangible assets by adding the nominal value of tangible
assets of the Household (Table B.100, FL152010005), Corporate Non-Financial sector (Table
B.102, FL102010005) and Non-corporate Non-Financial sector (Table B.103, FL112010005)
from the September 2009 release of the US Flow of Funds. GDP is nominal GDP excluding
the value added of the Government sector (Table 1.1.5, Line 1-Line 21). Data is for the
period 1952-2008. The model counterparts to the ratio of tangible assets to GDP is dened
as follows:
q
Y H + Y L  XH  XL
G.4 Computing aggregate corporate leverage
We use corporate (Table B.102, FL102000005) and non-corporate (Table B.103, FL112000005)
total assets. This includes both tangible and nancial assets on rmsbooks. For corporate
net worth we use the market value of corporate equity (Table B.102, FL103164003). For
non-corporate net worth we use the net worth data in Table B.103, FL112090205. Leverage
is computed as (Assets-Net Worth)/Assets.
The model counterpart to aggregate corporate leverage is dened as follows:
LA =
qK
q + (Y H + Y L) =R
G.5 Computing the second moments in the data
Our measure of GDP is private sector value added (Table 1.1.5, Line 1-Line 21). Consump-
tion is the sum of non-durable goods and services consumption. The value of the rm is
proxied by the S&P 500. All series have been deated by the non-durable goods deator to
convert them them into real terms (non-durables consumption goods). All data is annual
and the data sample is 1929-2008. Total employment in hours is obtained from the Bureau
of Labour Statistics. The sample is 1964 - 2008. We convert the monthly data into annual
averages. All data is detrended using the HP lter. Following Uhlig and Ravn (2001) we use
a smoothing parameter of 2.06 for annual data
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H Deriving the tax wedge formulation for steady state
uHt
The user cost of capital for low productivity entrepreneurs is
uLt = qt  
qt+1
Rt
while that for high productivity entrepreneurs is
uHt = qt  


Rt
+
1  
RHt+1

qt+1
We can re-write the uHt expression in terms of the excess return on wealth for high produc-
tivity entrepreneurs
uHt = qt  
qt+1
Rt
+ (1  ) qt+1

1
Rt
  1
RHt+1

= uLt + (1  )
qt+1
Rt

1  1
t+1

where
t+1 =
RHt+1
Rt
is the excess return. We can use the user cost expression to substitute out the expected
future price in terms of ex-dividendvalue of capital:
uHt = u
L
t + (1  )
 
qt   uLt

1  1
t+1

= uLt

1 + (1  )

qt
uLt
  1

1  1
t+1

= uLt [1 +  t]
This completes our derivation of the downpayment tax wedge:
 t = (1  )

qt
uLt
  1

1  1
t+1

60
I Deriving the level of TFP in steady state
The level of TFP is given by the following expression:
TFPt =
Y Ht + Y
L
t 
1

 HHt 1+HLt 1

 XHt 1+XLt 1
1  
1  
We know that:
Y Lt =
1

w+ 1t 1
 
uLt 1
1 
(1 Kt 1)
Y Ht =
aH

w+ 1t 1
 
uHt 1
1 
Kt 1
=
aH (1 +  ())1 

w+ 1t 1
 
uLt 1
1 
Kt 1
where we have used the fact that uHt = (1 +  ())u
L
t . Aggregate intermediate input invest-
ment in given by:
XHt 1 +X
L
t 1 =


uLt 1 (1 Kt 1 + (1 +  ())Kt 1)
=


uLt 1 (1 +  ()Kt 1)
HHt 1 +H
L
t 1 =
1    

uLt 1
wt 1
(1 Kt 1 + (1 +  ())Kt 1)
=
1    

uLt 1
wt 1
(1 +  ()Kt 1)
Aggregate TFP for our economy is therefore given by:
TFPt =
1 +Kt 1

aH (1 +  ())1    1
1 +  ()Kt 1
J Deriving the aggregate state
In setting up the individual maximisation problem, we had assumed that aggregate wealth
Zt and the share of wealth that belongs to productive individuals dt are the key endogenous
state variables. Following the derivation of the conditions for optimal consumption and
investment by entrepreneurs, we can see why this is indeed the case. We do this by showing
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that our market clearing conditions are functions of current and expected future market
prices as well as the state variables in question.
Starting with the bond market clearing condition (15) we can see straight away from
the collateral constraint that the gross amounto of debt in any given period is given by the
condition:
Bt = Etqt+1Kt
The aggregate capital holding of high productivity entrepreneurs is given by:
Kt = 
dtZt
qt + (1  )uHt =  Etqt+1=Rt
which implies that debt is a function of market prices and Wt and dt.
Moving on to the capital market clearing condition (16) we already know that capital
demand by high productivity agents is recursive in the aggregate state. The capital demand
of low productivity entrepreneurs is:
(1 Kt) =  (1  dt)Zt  Bt=Rt 
qt +
1 

uLt

=
 (1  dt)Zt   Etqt+1Kt=Rt 
qt +
1 

uLt

This implies that the capital market clearing condition is a function of market prices as well
as Wt and dt.
Finally looking at the goods market clearing condition (17) we can see that because of
log utility, consumption is proportional to individual wealth and, consequently, aggregate
consumption by entrepreneurs is proportional to aggregate wealth:
CEt  CHt + CLt = (1  )Zt
The consumption of workers is very simple because they do not save in equilibrium:
CWt = wtHt = wt

wt

 1

Due to the Cobb-Douglas production function, the aggregate expenditure on intermediate
input in the economy is given by the following expression:
XHt +X
L
t =
1  

 
uHt Kt + u
L
t (1 Kt)

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where we already know that the capital demands of the two groups are recursive in the state.
The denition of total wealth implies that:
Y Ht + Y
L
t = Wt   qt
So goods market clearing depends on market prices as well as Wt and dt.
K Deriving the Social Welfare Function
The government solves the following policy problem.

0 = maxfig
E0
"X
i
& iE
1X
t=0
t ln cit
#
+ &W
1X
t=0
t ln
 
CWt   {
(Ht)
1+!
1 + !
!
(32)
We can represent the net present value of period utilities of the two groups as the sum of
Pareto weighted value functions:

0 = maxfig
E0
"X
i
& iEV
E
 
zi0; a
i
0; X0ji

+ &WV W
 
X0ji
#
(33)
= max
fig
E0
"X
i
& i

'
 
ai0; X0ji

+
ln zi0 (
i)
1  

+ &WV W
 
X0ji
#
(34)
Under the assumption that all entrepreneurs hold their group average level of initial wealth
and all workers hold zero wealth allows us to re-write the value function (34) as follows:

0 = maxfig
E0

d0Z0

'H
 
X0ji

+
lnZH0 (
i)
1  

+ (1  d0)Z0

'H
 
X0ji

+
lnZH0 (
i)
1  

+

1 + !
!
wt

V W
 
X0ji

L Sensitivity Analysis
L.1 Sensitivity to aH
We performed extensive sensititivity analysis to check whether the value of aH a¤ected the
results. We found that it did not and the result from the exercise are shown in Table A
below. Again, at each value of aH , the model is recalibrated for each parameter value in
order to match our ve targets from the data).
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The value of aH has two o¤setting e¤ects on the incentives to regulate. A higher value of
aH increases amplication because uctuations in the share of wealth of high productivity
entrepreneurs leads to bigger endogenous uctuations in TFP and land prices. This would
increase the incentive of the government to impose capital requirements in order to dampen
the amplication mechanism. But a higher value of aH also increases the benets of getting
more funds into productive hands so the welfare costs of capital requirements in terms
of lower average productivity and consumption also increase. We examined a number of
di¤erent values of aH and found that at all of them, the government chose not to regulate.
Table A: Capital requirements and welfare under di¤erent values of aH
aH = 1:05 Baseline aH = 1:25
1004 ln'H0 -0.25 -0.23 0.02
1004 lnZH0 -1.07 -4.15 -7.60
1004 lnV H0 -0.44 -1.15 -2.01
1004 ln'L0 0.26 1.11 1.97
1004 lnZL0 -0.16 -0.71 -1.55
1004 lnV L0 0.03 0.04 -0.11
1004 lnV W0 0.06 0.14 0.17
1004 lnV0 -0.10 -0.33 -0.66
1004c -0.02 -0.12 -0.21
1004cW -0.01 -0.03 -0.08
1004cH -0.22 -0.60 -0.75
1004cL 0.02 -0.06 -0.18
L.2 Sensitivity to the form of the borrowing constraint
L.2.1 Worst caseborrowing limit
We also experimented with an alternative borrowing constraint of the form:
bt 6 qlt+1kt
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Such a constraint focuses on the value of collateral in the low aggregate productivity state.
So it would be equivalent to a worst casescenario value of collateral. Such a borrowing
constraint also introduces two opposing incentives for the government. The case for higher
regulation arises because the externality is much more severe under this constraint. This is
because volatility of asset prices now has a rst order e¤ect on borrowing constraints. The
more volatile land prices are, the more constrained entrepreneurs become because lenders
become worried by large falls in the land price. This externality means that capital re-
quirements might be benecial because they reduce volatility and may even relax borrowing
constraints.
But there is another o¤setting e¤ect. Suppose entrepreneurs attempt to leverage up and
this leads to an increase in land price volatility. This would lead to tighter borrowing limits,
stopping the rise in leverage in the rst place. So the worst caseborrowing constraints
exhibit a lot self-regulation which is missing in the standard expected value borrowing
constraints we consider in the main paper. This self-regulation e¤ect makes government
regulation unnecessary in equilibrium.
Table B: Capital requirements and welfare under worst caseborrowing contracts
 = 0:80  = 0:90  = 1:00
1004 ln'H0 -0.33 -0.31 -0.25
1004 lnZH0 -1.06 -1.79 -3.68
1004 lnV H0 -0.33 -0.55 -1.04
1004 ln'L0 0.37 0.54 0.96
1004 lnZL0 -0.14 -0.30 -0.61
1004 lnV L0 0.05 0.04 0.05
1004 lnV W0 -0.09 -0.02 0.11
1004 lnV0 -0.18 -0.34 -0.29
1004c -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
1004cW -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
1004cH -0.08 -0.13 -0.20
1004cL 0.00 0.01 -0.01
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L.2.2 Collateralisable output
In this case the borrowing constraint is of the form:
bt 6 Et (qt+1kt + yyt+1)
Entrepreneurs can now borrow up to the full value of their capital holdings and also up to a
fraction y of their future output. The results are shown in Table C below. Again, looking at
the e¤ects of this parameter did not change the basic result that aggregate welfare declined
as the result of the imposing tighter capital requirements.
Table C: Capital requirements and welfare under collateralisable output
Baseline y = 0:1 y = 0:2
1004 ln'H0 -0.23 -0.34 -0.39
1004 lnZH0 -4.15 -1.27 -1.78
1004 lnV H0 -1.15 -0.44 -0.55
1004 ln'L0 1.11 0.25 0.35
1004 lnZL0 -0.71 -0.21 -0.28
1004 lnV L0 0.04 -0.01 -0.01
1004 lnV W0 0.14 -0.05 -0.07
1004 lnV0 -0.33 -0.13 -0.14
1004c -0.12 -0.06 -0.10
1004cW -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
1004cH -0.60 -0.26 -0.42
1004cL -0.06 -0.04 -0.07
M Solution method
M.1 The Laissez Faire economy
We use the following parameterised expectationsalgorithm in order to solve for the recursive
competitive equilibrium of our model economy.
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1. Start by guessing parameter values for current and future expected price functions.
All equilibrium pricing functions are log linear in the state variables dt and Zt.
ln q (Xt+1jXt) = !c (Xt+1jXt) + !d (Xt+1jXt) ln dt + !w (Xt+1jXt) lnZt (35)
ln q (Xt) = 'c (Xt) + 'd (Xt) ln dt + 'w (Xt) lnZt (36)
ln r (Xt+1jXt) = c (Xt+1jXt) + d (Xt+1jXt) ln dt + w (Xt+1jXt) lnZt (37)
where Xt is the aggregate state of the economy.
2. Static portfolio maximisation
Next we nd optimal leverage levels. Due to the non-convex choice set we need to compute
and compare the value function when the constraint is binding and when it is non-binding.
We pick the leverage choices associated with the largest of the two value functions.
(a) The value of the constraint binding is
RH (lt+1 = ) = Et lnRHt+1
= Et ln
" 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1   Etqt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =  (=Rt)Etqt+1
#
where
uHt = qt   Et

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
  Etqt+1Et

1
RLt+1
  1
RHt+1

(38)
is the user cost of capital under the binding constraint.
(b) The value of the constraint not binding
RH (lt+1 < ) = max
0<lt+1<
Et lnR
H
t+1
= max
0<lt+1<
Et ln
" 
At+1a
H=

w+ 1t
 
uHt
1 
+ qt+1   ltEtqt+1
qt + (1  )uHt =  (lt=Rt)Etqt+1
#
where
uHt = qt   Et

qt+1
RHt+1

is the user cost when the constraint does not bind. We solve this maximisation problem
using the inbuilt Matlab function fmincon.m
3. Compute the equilibrium at time t:
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We use the latest guess of the qt+1 pricing function, the portfolio policy function lt+1 as
well as the current realisations of the state variables At, dt and Wt.
RLt+1 =

At+1
w+ 1t (uLt )
1 

+ qt+1

(1 Kt) + lt+1q (Xt+1)Kt
qt +
1 

uLt

(1 Kt) + (lt+1=Rt)Etqt+1Kt
(39)
where
uLt = qt   Et

qt+1
RLt+1

High productivity entrepreneurs invest the following fraction of their wealth in capital.
Kt =
dtWt
qt +
1 

uHt   (lt+1=Rt)Etqt+1
(40)
Their rate of return is given by:
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when the collateral constraint is slack and
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Finally, goods market clearing is:
(1  )Wt + wtHt + 1  


uLt (1 Kt) + uHt Kt

= Wt   qt
Using the inbuilt Matlab zero-nding routine fsolve.m, solve for the values of
Rt; R
L
t+1; Kt; qt; R
H
t+1; u
H
t ; u
L
t
	
at which these conditions are satised up to an error tol-
erance level.
4. Use the state evolution equations to compute next periods state vector:
Wt+1 =

dtR
H
t+1 + (1  dt)RLt+1

Wt (42)
dt+1 =
(1  )dtRHt+1 + n (1  dt)RLt+1
dtRHt+1 + (1  dt)RLt+1
(43)
5. Repeat steps (1)-(4) for 2000 periods. Using the simulated data (minus a 200 pe-
riod burn in period), update the price and forecasting function coe¢ cients using linear
regression.
6. Re-compute a simulated time series of the endogenous variables in our model economy
under the new forecasting rule. Repeat steps (1)-(5) until the coe¢ cients on the forecasting
rule have converged up to an error tolerance level.
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M.2 The economy with capital requirements
In our government economy, the government chooses state contingent leverage functions et
in order to maximise social welfare

 = max
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 
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
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
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(1.) Pose a candidate leverage function and make a starting guess on its parameters. In
this paper we guess a rst order log-linear formulation for each aggregate state i = h; l.
ln et = i0 + i1 ln dt + i2 lnZt
(2.) Compute the equilibrium quantities of our model economy using steps (1)-(6) in the
previous subsection
(3.) Compute the entrepreneursvalue function
' (at; dt; Zt; At) = ln (1  ) +
 ln  + Et
 
lnRit+1

1   + Et' (at+1; dt+1; Zt+1; At+1)
and the workersvalue function
V W (dt; Zt; At) =  +
!
1 + !
lnwt + EtV
W (dt+1; Zt+1; At+1)
(3.1.) Discretise the space of the continuous state variables dt and Zt. We use 10 grid
points on each state variable. The value function is almost linear in the direction of both
state variables so using more grid points makes very little di¤erence to the results while
slowing down the computations considerably.
(3.2.) Use value function iterations to compute the value function at each grid point.
When state variables fall in between grid points, we use bi-linear interpolation to approximate
the value function.
(4.) Compute social welfare for the candidate leverage function et. This consists of two
steps:
69
(4.1.) Compute the realisation of the capital price in the initial period when the private
sector is surprised by the policy change. This allows us to compute the realisations of the
aggregate state variables (the vector X0) when the policy is announced. It also allows us to
compute the realisations of the wealth of each group when the policy is announced.
(4.2) Evaluate the the social welfare function (44) at the post regulation reform aggregate
state X0 and individual wealth positions - zH0 and z
L
0 .
(5.) Place steps (1)-(4) above in a function which outputs the value of social welfare for
a candidate leverage function and maximise it with respect to the parameters of the leverage
function. Because function evaluations are very time consuming we use the inbuilt Matlab
routine fminsearch.m which uses a Nelder-Meade algorithm.
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